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Introduction: The Analytic-Continental Divide 
For most of the twentieth and now also the twenty-first century, the world of 
academic philosophy has been plagued by the so-called “analytic-continental divide.” In 
recent years, numerous attempts have been made to understand and bridge the ‘divide’ 
because leading philosophers have realized that the sharp division between the two styles 
or traditions of philosophy has produced some harmful results for the discipline as a 
whole. Brian Leiter, who occupies an important position in the academic profession of 
philosophy due to his leading role in “The Philosophical Gourmet Report,” a semi-
official ranking of philosophy departments in the English-speaking world, has been vocal 
about these negative developments in contemporary philosophy: “There are rather 
unadmirable reasons for identifying on one side of the divide or the other… it entitles you 
not to know certain things…. It encourages a destructive kind of parochialism.”1 There is 
an “acceptable sphere of ignorance” that comes with a direct identification with either 
side of the divide that tends to result in a sort of intellectual incest amongst the different 
camps. At their worst, philosophers on both sides learn only the conceptual frameworks 
that are specific to their own “traditions”, which makes any meaningful debate between 
the two sides extremely difficult. Perennial issues such as the nature and criteria of 
knowledge, for example, are often bludgeoned with arguments stemming from 
uncritically adopted paradigms. Given this situation, it is difficult to see how progress in 
philosophy would be even possible—much less encouraged. Dialogue between the two 
sides is cut off before it begins. 
 If this is the case, then, what is Leiter’s diagnosis of the situation? For him, the 
answer is simple. The divide is really nothing more than a superficial distinction based 
                                                                    
1
 See Brian Leiter and Nigel Warburton, Philosophy Bites, http://philosophybites.com/. 
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predominantly on stylistic differences in philosophical writing.
2
 Whereas analytic 
philosophy pursues its various tasks using a research methodology that is similar to the 
natural sciences—valuing argumentative clarity and precision—continental philosophy is 
prone to adopt a more “literary” style that aims to illuminate core questions of the so-
called “human situation” in ways that formal logic or conceptual analysis could never 
achieve by themselves.
3
  
Leiter is not the only philosopher who takes this view of the analytic-continental 
divide, of course, but for the sake of this study he represents the “superficial” thesis (i.e. 
the thesis that the divide is basically composed of differences that are not philosophically 
substantive). This approach is slightly different from that of Iain Thomson, who proposes 
a Hegelian reading of the divide. For Thomson, there are genuine philosophical 
differences between the two camps, including most notably Bertrand Russell’s extended 
critique of German Idealism in the name of his “logical atomism.”4 However, most of the 
actual conflict that characterizes the divide is political.
5
 Citing reasons similar to Leiter’s 
notion of the acceptable sphere of ignorance that comes with the divide, Thomson says 
that the most determinative element is a certain brand of identity politics. Those on 
                                                                    
2
 “Analytic" philosophy today names a style of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of 
substantive views.” See Brian Leiter, “Philosophical Gourmet Report,” 
http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/. 
3
 Bertrand Russell’s (in)famous quip about Friedrich Nietzsche takes this line of argumentation. He writes 
polemically in his History of Western Philosophy  that “Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather 
than an academic philosopher. He invented no new theories in ontology or epistemology.” Bertrand Russell, 
The History of Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1972),. 
4
 Russell describes his philosophy as a way of preserving “the common-sense belief that there are many 
separate things . . . that are not just as consisting merely in phases and unreal divisions of a single 
indivisible Reality.” Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism in: Readings in Twentieth 
Century Philosophy edited by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (New York: The Free Press, 
1963), 298. 
5
 “Analytic resistance to continental philosophy continues to take the form of opposition to any style that 
seems to be deliberately “obscure” (that is, any style in which it seems that the philosopher is not even 
trying to write clearly), even if only extremists still advance the old charge that the function of such obscure 
styles is to conceal the “fascism” or “Nazism” hidden at their core.” Iain Thomson, “In the Future 
Philosophy will be Neither Continental Nor Analytic but Synthetic,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
50.2 (June 2012): 197.  
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opposite sides tend to view one another as a threat to their own style of philosophizing. 
For Thomson, what is needed is a Hegelian synthesis of opposites, in which the best 
attributes of each as a historical phenomenon are preserved. Instead of perpetuating such 
an identity politics within the discipline of philosophy, a genuine engagement between 
sides should yield a fuller and more robust philosophical academy. Even for Thomson, 
though, it is difficult to identify a clearly marked “opposite” from which such a synthesis 
could emerge. To his credit, Thomson does identify some concrete personalities who 
seem to embody this synthesis (Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, for example), 
valuing analytic clarity without sacrificing the sincerity and depth of the continental 
mode of questioning.
6
 So, although he is more explicit about the political element of the 
divide, Thomson also seems to adopt another version of the superficial thesis.  
Against the superficial thesis of Leiter and Thomson, continental specialist 
Babette Babich argues that “[t]emperament and style . . . do not exhaust the distinction to 
be made between analytic and [c]ontinental approaches to philosophy, for the distinction 
constitutes a [real] divide.”7 While she does agree with others who say that the analytic 
style is unique because it resembles the scientific method by valuing argumentative rigor 
and clear conclusions, she insists upon a unique, identifiable philosophical distinction 
that is not simply stylistic. According to her, the distinctive trait of analytic philosophy as 
a scholarly enterprise is its “deflationary” character. Drawing on the movement of logical 
positivism as a paradigm case, Babich remarks that the goal of analytic philosophy is not 
                                                                    
6
 Ibid., 200.  
7
 Babette Babich, “The Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s 
Speaking Language and Philosophy,” in A House Divided: Analytic and Continental Philosophy (Amherst, 
NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 64.  
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to solve philosophical problems but rather to dissolve them.
8
 This means that the 
discipline is more about revealing the phony or imprecise nature of ancient questions than 
actually engaging with them seriously. Thus, by a radical parting of ways with the 
tradition prior to the twentieth century, analytic philosophy does its best to show why the 
core issues of philosophy are usually just grammatical mistakes.
9
  
Babich argues that continental philosophy, by contrast, does most of its work in 
“intensifying” philosophical problems in new and creative ways. This continental attitude 
is not merely evident from the careful by continental thinkers’ attention to the contingent 
circumstances (i.e. position in history, culture, etc.) in which philosophy is always 
already caught up, but also from their ready acknowledgment of philosophy’s perennial 
nature. 
Needless to say, Babich’s  characterization of the divide is not popular amongst 
those who identify themselves as analytic philosophers.
10
 Indeed, there may be good 
reason to believe that Babich’s approach is too caught up in polemics, which makes it 
difficult to sketch an accurate portrayal of the twentieth century’s analytic turn. Moreover, 
her distinction between “solving” and “dissolving” a question is rather dubious. It is 
difficult to ascertain how “solve” could mean something different than “dissolve” in this 
context. On the surface, at least, to solve a problem is to do away with a problem (what 
else could it mean?—unless it is somehow the task of philosophy to continue pondering 
on about solved problems). Without denying her observations regarding the different 
                                                                    
8
 Ibid., 64.  
9
 One might recall Ludwig Wittgenstein’s bold assertion in the Philosophical Investigations: “philosophical 
problems arise when language goes on holiday.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 38.  
10
 “[Babich’s article] consists largely of assertions about analytic philosophy and citations of other people’s 
assertions. A reader somewhat familiar with both traditions will be puzzled as to why some of these 
assertions are taken to be true.” Samuel Wheeler, “Review of A House Divided: Analytic and Continental 
Philosophy,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 12, 2004).  
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tendencies of each side of the divide, it is still difficult to pinpoint a clearly defined, 
substantive philosophical disagreement in Babich’s assessment.    
Another contemporary philosopher who is interested in assessing the analytic-
continental divide is Lee Braver, who succeeds in actually articulating a clear 
philosophical disagreement that characterizes the divide, namely the realism/anti-realism 
debate. In his book, A Thing of this World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism, he 
points out with remarkable precision the complex manifestations of anti-realism as a 
phenomenon that seems to underlie many continental approaches to philosophy.
11
 Of 
course, there are exceptions to a simple contrast whereby continental philosophers tend to 
identify with different variations of anti-realism while analytics favor realism. Some of 
these exceptions are simply too prominent to ignore.
12
  
Nevertheless, Braver’s history examines the divide in a substantial and fruitful 
way. This is especially true when comparing his deeply historical assessment with some 
aforementioned, shallower mainstream alternatives.  Even so, Braver’s rigorously argued 
and commendable attempt at diagnosis is of little help when it comes to showing a 
coherent way toward overcoming the divide. As a continental philosopher himself, 
Braver seems to engage the supposed realism of analytic philosophy as if it were a 
“reactionary chunk of petrified wood that has nothing to teach us.”13 In any case, the 
                                                                    
11
 According to Braver, there are at least six meaningful ways in which the anti-realism/realism debate 
manifests itself in philosophy after the divide, including: (1) “The world is not/is dependent on the 
mind; (2) Truth is/is not correspondence; (3) There is/is not one true and complete description of how the 
world is (4); Any statement is/is not necessarily either true or untrue; (5) Knowledge is/is not passive with 
respect to what it knows; (6) The human subject does/does not have a fixed character. Graham Harman, “A 
Festival of Anti-Realism: Braver’s History of Continental Thought,” Philosophy Today 52.2 (Summer 
2008), 198. 
12
 The recent developments within the emerging philosophical school of “Speculative Realism” is a very 
obvious example of realism that chooses to engage in dialogue with exclusively continental philosophers. 
Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and 
Materialism (Melbourne: RePress, 2011).   
13
 Ibid., 198.  
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mysterious yet pernicious divide remains.  
Compared with Leiter’s, and even Thomson’s superficial theses, then, Braver’s 
view represents perhaps the most robust case for a “substantive”, non-superficial 
understanding of the divide.
14
 This essay is an attempt to take up and deepen Braver’s 
thesis about substantive philosophical differences at the heart of the divide between 
analytic and continental philosophy by pursuing the following questions: 
1. Is there an identifiable philosophical disagreement that explains the fundamental 
failure of analytic and continental philosophy to engage each other in a fruitful dialogue? 
If so, what is it? 
2. Once we have isolated this disagreement, what larger framework could be 
conducive for reaching a meaningful disagreement or agreement between analytic and 
continental philosophers?  
I will attempt to answer the first question in the affirmative by showing that the 
nature of the divide can be understood with reference to a controversy in Medieval 
Scholasticism between two mutually exclusive metaphysical frameworks, namely, 
Thomas Aquinas’ analogy of being (analogia entis) and John Duns Scotus’ univocity of 
being (univocatio entis). I argue that the differences between these two philosophies 
serve as a helpful hermeneutic lens through which the differing outlooks of continental 
and analytic philosophy may be perceived as a philosophically substantial disagreement 
about being qua being, rather than a mere stylistic difference. Although I do not claim 
that this reading provides a clear and present way to enable a comprehensive 
understanding of the divide, I do propose that it represents one clear and substantive 
                                                                    
14
 Although it should go without saying that there are many more important views on the nature and 
trajectory of the divide, I have chosen the previous ones as preliminary examples in order to set the 
framework of this particular study.  
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difference between major continental and analytic philosophers. To make this first point, 
I will begin by sketching a brief history of the Thomist analogy as it relates to the Scotist 
doctrine of univocity. This historical outline allows for a clear definition of terms I will 
then apply to the contemporary philosophical divide in the three “case studies” which 
will form the main body of this study.  
The first case study at issue is the exchange between Martin Heidegger and 
Gilbert Ryle, who, despite sharing mutual objects of critique, disagree fundamentally on 
the nature and possibility of the “things themselves” or objects in the world. The second 
case study to be explored is the [in]famous debate between Jacques Derrida and John 
Searle, which deals primarily with the philosophy of written language and, more 
specifically, the role of subjective intentionality and “iterability” in meaningful 
communication. The third and final case study concerns a debate in Christian philosophy 
between the contemporary movement of hermeneutic ontology (represented here in the 
polemic of James K.A. Smith) and the “Biola School” of Christian philosophy (William 
Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland). This debate has for its content the nature of knowledge and 
its relationship to being. In each of these three case studies, I will demonstrate that the 
Medieval positions of analogy and univocity govern the debates at their most 
fundamental levels.  
In a subsequent, slightly shorter section, I will then attempt to address my second 
concern: having identified arguably the most substantive difference between the two 
traditions, how can we move into a fruitful dialogue between them? It is my contention 
that Christian philosophical theology offers a unique and compelling framework in which 
a more robust debate can occur beyond simply the “analytic or continental” deadlock. 
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There may be, of course, suitable resources internal to “pure” philosophy that could also 
engender meaningful debate. After all, ideas such as explanatory power—the ability to 
explain various phenomena of common sense and empirical investigation—and logical 
coherence seem to apply in all good philosophy. Perhaps these more or less “purely 
philosophical” standards would be able to support either analogy or univocity as the more 
robust metaphysical paradigm.
15
  
However, to my mind, Christian philosophical theology is even better situated for 
the task of framing a fruitful debate between continental and analytic philosophers for at 
least three reasons: 
1. The historical context for univocity and analogy and thus for the terms that help 
define the substantial difference between the traditions is clearly theological. 
Theology is crucial for understanding the historical context and development of 
both analogy and univocity. This allows for a clearer definition of terms—one that 
includes without reservation or embarrassment the concept of God.  
2. In order for debate to be intelligibly Christian, charitable hermeneutics—a 
hermeneutics that does not hold one’s opposing position to be suspicious a 
priori—would have to be employed by both sides. Although this point might 
sound trivial, (or worse, sentimental), its importance is apparent in the train wreck 
that is the Derrida-Searle debate.  While of course charitable hermeneutics is not 
limited to a Christian philosophical approach, it does (or should) encourage an 
intentional environment of such charitableness.  
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 By “purely philosophical” I simply mean something that is more or less universally recognized by 
serious figures across various traditions of philosophy.  
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3. A shared theological context of revelation offers even more common ground for 
debate. For example, instead of continental philosophers flatly denying the 
existence of a neutral, “objective” starting point for philosophy, they could appeal 
to specific interpretations of theological doctrines of God’s transcendence, human 
fallenness, or a related concept in a more articulate, positive manner.
16
  
While I do not want to assume a romantic disposition of “building bridges” in this study, 
I do recognize the possibility and importance of productive philosophical debate between 
analytic and continental traditions of philosophy. Even if it is extremely difficult to make 
a coherent, positive case for even one specific end towards which philosophy should 
absolutely strive as a discipline, what is clear is that the fragmentation that results from 
such a divide cannot be one of them. This point is evident in the three case studies in the 
latter part of this essay—especially in the exchange between Derrida and Searle. For 
these reasons and others, I take it to be an important task to demonstrate ways of thinking 
about the possibility of meaningful dialogue between analytic and continental philosophy.        
Before moving on, it is worth noting a final advantage of identifying the divide by 
means of this rather specific topic of analogia and univocatio rather than through another 
more “contemporary” theme such as Braver’s aforementioned realism and anti-realism 
distinction. I believe that the following diagnosis is superior insofar as it lends itself quite 
naturally to a philosophical ethos that encompasses both twentieth century analytic and 
continental philosophy. This ethos is the “linguistic turn” in philosophy.  
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 To take just one example of such a way of thinking, we can consider Heidegger’s answer to a question 
about the apparent identity between God and being at the 1951 Zurich seminar: “I believe that Being can 
never be thought as the ground or essence of God, but that nevertheless the experience of God and of his 
manifestedness, . . . flashes in the dimension of Being.” See Martin Heidegger, “The Reply to the Third 
Question at the Seminar in Zurich, 1951,” accessed in: Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 61-62.  
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The linguistic turn is usually applied in reference to the development in analytic 
philosophy that includes Gottlob Frege’s “On Sense and Reference”, Bertrand Russell’s 
“On Denoting” and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. However, 
there is equally good reason to apply such a label to the development of continental 
philosophy characterized by the movements of structuralism and post-structuralism, 
highlighted by Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics and Derrida’s 
Writing and Difference. 
What unites these otherwise disparate texts is a consensus regarding the 
importance of language in philosophy. After this dual linguistic turn—in analytic and 
continental philosophy alike—it becomes necessary to draw out the complicated 
relationship between “sense” and “reference” (analytic) and “signifier” and “signified” 
(continental). This linguistic turn problematizes what was once perhaps the commonsense 
understanding of language and reality operating in neat, hermetically-sealed realms, 
leaving both sides of the divide with a new task: to sketch a philosophy of language that 
can accommodate the rigors of conceptual analysis (analytic) and match the descriptive 
power of phenomenological scrutiny (contintental).  
The positions of analogy and univocity are metaphysical in nature; however, they 
also represent the building blocks of a philosophy of language. After all, they are 
competing claims about the nature of being qua being, or being itself. Insofar as the 
analytic-continental divide is linguistic in nature, there is good reason to note its 
fundamental structure accordingly.
17
  
                                                                    
17
 Hans-Georg Gadamer makes a similar point in his Philosophical Hermeneutics: “It is no accident, it 
seems to me, that in recent decades the phenomenon of language has come to the center of philosophical 
inquiry. Perhaps one can even say htat under this bannder even the greatest kind of philosophical gulf that 
exists between peoples—the one between Anglo-Saxon nominalism on the one and and the metaphysical 
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Aristotle and Being qua Being 
 We now turn to the meaning of the two positions of analogy and univocity. 
Because the latter grows from the former, it is important to provide at least a rough 
historical sketch of the context out of which the positions arise. Although Aquinas and 
Scotus represent the fullest development of each respective concept (for the purposes of 
this study, at least), Aristotle is the first to raise explicitly the problem of being qua being 
and analogy in his metaphysics.  
 In Book Gamma of Metaphysics, Aristotle clarifies the fundamental task of 
philosophy in its purest form: “There is a kind of science whose remit is being qua 
being . . . [it] is not the same as any of the departmental disciplines. For none of these 
latter engages in this general speculation about that which is qua that which is.”18 This 
science, which aims to clarify what it means to say that something has being—especially 
as this curious word being is applied to all that exists—is philosophy in its purest form. 
Unlike the so-called “departmental disciplines,” Aristotle conceives of philosophy as that 
which seeks after the most fundamental cause or principle of reality.19 Being qua being is 
this most fundamental cause or principle.  
 In order to arrive at this ultimate goal of understanding being qua being, Aristotle 
takes an important cue from his teacher, Plato. While acknowledging that particular 
beings are in a state of flux—in a state of becoming rather than being—it is important to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
tradition on the Continent on the other—has begun to be bridged.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics (London: University of California Press, 1976), 75.  
18
 Aristotle, The Metaphysics (New York: Penguin Classics, 1999), 1003a.  
19
 “[T]he things that are most known are the primary things and the causes. For it is through them and from 
them that the other things are known and not the latter through the underlying things.” Ibid., 982b.  
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take heed of what stays resilient and changeless because, presumably, being qua being 
does not change from one specific instantiation to another. 
 It is in order to determine a particular being’s unchanging qualities that Aristotle 
develops his controversial notion of “substance.”20 Although he does attempt to give a 
properly metaphysical account of substance in his Metaphysics, it is important to 
understand its basic logical status first so that it is intelligible as a concept.21 Aristotle 
does this in his short work, Categories, in which he remarks, “A substance—that which is 
called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said 
of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse.”22 At its 
most basic logical level, substance is that which cannot serve as a predicate modifying a 
prior subject.  
 To illustrate this point, consider a couple of examples that Aristotle himself uses. 
It might seem like the word “man” is more basic than “individual man” because the 
former serves as a “species” under which the latter falls. However unlike Plato, Aristotle 
is not so much interested in seeing otherworldly wholes beyond this-worldly particulars 
                                                                    
20
 Many have disputed the English rendering of this Greek term, οὐ σία, as “substance”. The latter is 
derived from the Latin, substantia (literally, standing-under), which is, in turn, derived from an earlier 
Latin term, essentia. The problem here, according to scholars like Joseph Owens, is that the medieval 
translation comes too close to committing itself to a position that Aristotle himself rejects in Book M of 
The Metaphysics. Far from just “standing-under” particular qualities or accidental properties, οὐ σία has 
direct ties with the ontological difference between being qua being and particular beings. See Joseph 
Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1978), 138. While recognizing and appreciating this corrective’s function in the following 
argument, I will continue to use the English “substance” in this study for familiarity’s sake.       
21
 By this distinction between “properly metaphysical” and “logical”, I mean something along the lines of 
what Howard Robinson means in his entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled 
“Substance”: namely, the difference between a systematic engagement with other important metaphysical 
concepts like Form and matter and, more narrowly, simply a linguistic analysis whose primary constituents 
are the notions of subject and predicate. Howard Robinson, “Substance,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/substance/. 
22
 Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 2a11.  
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as he is in understanding what being a particular actually means. His goal is to identify 
primary substance. That is why Aristotle acknowledges species (i.e. man) as a 
“secondary” substance—closer to primary substance than the even more general category 
of genus (i.e. animal), but not quite the primary substance itself.23  
Aristotle’s notion of primary substance seeks to determine the “thisness” of a 
particular being. As we have seen, the logical status of primary substance is that it cannot 
serve as a predicate for an existing subject (i.e. it is not sensible to say that “man is this 
individual man”). The primary substance possesses a logical integrity in itself, and is thus 
immune to any further conceptual analysis.  
The task of understanding primary substance proves to be more difficult, however, 
once these parameters are extended from a strictly logical analysis to his metaphysical 
system as a whole. More specifically, it is still unclear how or to what extent primary 
substance can be accounted in the context of a reality of flux. Indeed, such an inability is 
at the heart of  the Stagirite’s critique of Platonic Form:  
Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the 
substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances 
of things, exist apart? In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way—that the Forms 
are causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the 
things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to 
originate movement.24  
 
Aristotle presents two basic metaphysical problems here, both of which are important for 
understanding his account of substance.  
The first of these issues is the question-begging nature of the supposed dualism 
between the Form of a particular, material being (i.e. an individual man) and the 
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 Ibid. 
24
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 991b.  
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particular being itself. If the Form is supposed to be the ideal of some material being—
yet exist in some incorporeal state—it is difficult to ascertain how or to what extent it is 
possible to ascribe the same substance to both Form and material being. For example, 
how does one know whether the ideal form “man” and its material representation are both 
versions of the same individual human being? It seems as though there is at least one 
non-accidental difference in the properties of both, namely, that one exists in an 
incorporeal state, and the other does not. This is a problem because Form and matter are 
supposed to be different manifestations of the same thing.  
 The second metaphysical problem has to do with causation. Again, Aristotle is 
concerned with fundamental principles, which means he is interested in how being qua 
being can be causative. Because the Platonic Forms are immaterial, it is difficult to 
understand the relationship they have with their corresponding material beings as 
anything but an obscure sophism. This, in turn, makes it difficult to ascertain how the 
former could be the cause for the latter,
25
 which compels Aristotle to make a rather snide 
remark about his teacher’s greatest theory: “[T]hings do not come to be from the Forms 
in any of the usual senses of ‘from.’ And to say that the Forms are patterns and that the 
other things participate in them is to use empty words and poetic metaphors.”26 It is clear 
that Aristotle does not think that Plato’s image of “participation” helps bridge the gap 
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 It is important to note here that “one thing causing another” [why is it important to note this?  May it be 
important to say clearly why and integrate that reason into your main text?] has a larger meaning for 
Aristotle than it does in modernity. He notes four causes: material (referring to material elements out of 
which the particular being is composed), efficient (that which sets the particular being into motion in the 
strictest sense), formal (the distinctive shape into which the particular being is fashioned), and final (the 
aim or purpose served by the particular being). Modern physics has usually admitted the first two and 
denied the latter two. This represents, incidentally, a key shift in thought from Ancient/Medieval to Modern 
thought. See Ibid.   
26
 Ibid.  
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between Form and matter. It is instead a “poetic metaphor” used as an attempt to try in 
vain to escape what is an insurmountable impasse in his system.27  
 So, if it is not by positing an a-temporal realm in which the substance of particular 
beings exist apart from the flux that characterize their material counterparts, then how 
does Aristotle ground substance? His attempt to answer this question comes as a defense 
of what is now called his “hylemorphic” synthesis. This “bringing together” of form and 
matter consolidates what is perhaps Aristotle’s most original contribution to philosophy, 
but is also vital for understanding how he conceives of primary substance. 
 In order to understand the reasons behind Aristotle’s hylemorphic synthesis, it is 
important to understand that there are two extreme positions Aristotle wishes to evade. 
The first is the position that matter is formless, or that it lacks any intelligibility. This 
position of rabid skepticism is an unacceptable “counsel of despair for any Greek 
philosopher.”28 However, as we just explored, for Aristotle the “opposite” position—the 
Platonic insistence upon ideal, incorporeal Forms as explanatory measures for changeable, 
material reality—is also unacceptable. The reason for this is that there is no robust 
account for flux, aside from its accidental and even unfortunate role in muddying the 
waters of philosophical investigation. Indeed, on a standard Platonic view, flux is 
something that is there despite the philosopher’s best wishes. As an alternative to this 
                                                                    
27
 The philosopher R.E. Allen has disputed this critique of participation by examining the Greek term 
μέθεξις more closely. Far from the standard notion of the Form and matter maintaining a relationship that 
simply runs from “the more abstract to the more concrete,” Plato employs the word μέθεξις to denote a 
relationship that is analogous to that between “exemplars and exemplifications.” The key difference 
between the two analogies is that only the former overemphasizes the importance of common characters as 
the “activity” of μέθεξις, thereby losing the language of deficiency that is implicit in matter as it relates to 
Form. While this point is well-taken, it is not clear how an unmoving Form can cause a material being that 
is in flux. See R.E. Allen, “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues,” The Philosophical 
Review 69.2 (Apr 1960): 158-160. 
28
 Hugh Lawson-Tancred, “Substance,” in: Aristotle, Metaphysics, xxviii.  
Harris   17 
view, Aristotle seeks to draw a more robust picture of a world that embraces flux as a 
constitutive element of nature.   
 In order to accomplish these dual purposes—accommodating both rational 
intelligibility and flux—Aristotle rearticulates matter and form using the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality. Potentiality, which is active in brute matter, is defined as a 
“principle of change in another thing.”29 This means that potentiality as such is defined 
only insofar as it is dependent upon something outside of itself for motion. Again, 
“dependence” refers to an asymmetrical causal relation—not only in the modern sense of 
the material and efficient causes, but final and especially formal causes as well. By 
contrast, actuality is manifested in form, and is precisely that which serves as the 
principle or cause of its corresponding potentiality. It has no other principle or cause 
beside itself.  
A helpful illustration of this distinction between potentiality and actuality is in 
Book Theta of The Metaphysics: 
The fact is that the actuality of an object is its obtaining.30 And by this I do not 
have in mind its obtaining in that manner which we have accounted for in terms 
of potentiality. We say that something exists in potentiality if it is like a statue of 
Hermes existing in a block of wood.31 
 
The “block of wood” at issue here speaks to a piece of brute matter that can nevertheless 
be fashioned into a statue of Hermes. So, even before the block of wood has been 
fashioned, Aristotle might say that it is a statue of Hermes—that is, if we understand “is” 
in its limited sense, in terms of potentiality. He also says that actuality is a kind of 
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obtaining. But in what sense is the obtaining of actuality differ from the obtaining of 
potentiality? Aristotle’s answers, which lead us finally to the distinctive characteristics of 
primary substance, are two that have already been mentioned—namely, the causal power 
of actuality and its resistance to change.  
 In order to grasp Aristotle’s understanding of causal power, we focus on the latter 
two of the four causes: namely, final and formal. As we explored before, final cause 
expresses the teleological nature of material beings as ontologically constitutive. To 
return to the Aristotelian example of the block of wood that is fashioned to be a statue of 
Hermes: the block’s final cause or purpose (i.e. reverence of the god) is a necessary part 
of statue’s ontological constitution. Once again, it is the dynamic process of being that is 
at issue here. With such a scope—one that encompasses the entirety of the process (from 
wood to statue)—it becomes possible to achieve the explanatory power that Aristotle 
seeks. Only by understanding the object in the entirety of this process is it possible to 
grasp the four causes with meaningful distinction. This causal power “from both sides,” 
(efficient and final) so to speak, reflects the necessity of change from potentiality to 
actuality. 
 Once the block of wood is becomes a final product, its actuality is most clearly 
seen by way of its newfound resistance to change as a statue. Although it might seem 
simple enough, it is important to understand, once again, the difference between this form 
and the Platonic Form. Indeed, it might seem that Aristotle’s notion of formal cause has 
no choice but to resort back to some kind of Platonic Form, given that the defining 
characteristic of each philosopher’s concept is its resistance to change. While there is no 
doubt that the impetus for the search of such a thing is difficult to imagine without Plato’s 
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influence, there is nevertheless a key difference that sets their respective ontologies apart. 
Although it is true that both Platonic Form and Aristotelian formal cause are born from 
the same concern for stability in the midst of temporal flux, the two concepts differ as to 
how they suggest such a resistance to change. Platonic Form is changeless because it is 
non-material and transcendent. Its corresponding materiality derives stability from 
participating in the Form, but it can only do so as an eternally deficient and lacking copy 
of the original. Aristotelian formal cause, by contrast, does not possess immaterial 
transcendence; rather, it is itself immanent in its own instantiation in the material world. 
Its permanence is not derived from an extra-material source, but from active resistance to 
change.  In this way, then, Aristotelian formal cause paves the way for primary 
substance’s immanent reality as both causative of its object and resilient in the face of 
change.  
 So what is the best way of talking about being qua being, ultimately? While we 
have already said that Aristotle’s tentative first answer lies with primary substance, we 
now have a much clearer picture of the concepts he uses to justify and make sense of 
such a claim. First, primary substance is particularity; it is the “thisness” of a particular 
being. Primary substance’s logical structure is such that it cannot serve as a predicate for 
any prior subject. As we remarked before, this is why propositions such as “man 
(species) is this individual man (primary substance)” do not make sense. Second, our 
understanding of being as being is further refined by the recognition that primary 
substance stands as the formal cause of its material accidents. The illustration we looked 
at in this case was the wooden statue of Hermes. Although Aristotle would not deny that 
Harris   20 
a careful analysis would yield many material constituents (even ones of which he is not 
aware), his ontology is distinct from atomism because the shape or model into which 
those material constituents are fashioned is just as fundamentally real as the material 
constituents themselves. Because cause can be said in four ways, it is possible to speak of 
primary substance as causative.32  
 With this understanding of primary substance in place, it is possible to explore the 
ramifications for the overarching purpose of the present chapter: namely, to understand 
the competing positions of analogy and univocity.  
 According to Aristotle, there are at least two ways in which it is possible to speak 
in terms of analogy: as either a “four-term” and “two-term” analogy.33 A four-term 
analogy means “the second [term] is related to the first as the fourth is to the third.”34 An 
example of this four-term analogy is the following relation of infatuation: “As the cake is 
to the plump child, so is the young maiden to the lovestruck prince.” The four-term 
structure of this infatuation analogy makes explicit what are hidden premises in the two-
term analogy. So, while it is possible to say that the cake (first term) is lovely (second 
term), this is only possible with the help of the implicit structure of the aforementioned 
four-term analogy.  
Instead of relying only on the relation of genus to species—and species to primary 
substance—it is possible to describe relations that occur across separate genus and 
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species. In this way, then, “there is analogy in every category of what is.”35 This is the 
sense in which Aristotle’s understanding of analogy is all-encompassing.  
At this point, it might be tempting to ask the question of whether or not Aquinas’ 
version of analogia is merely an elaboration on Aristotle’s metaphysical framework. This 
might be true in a sense, as we will see shortly. However, just as there is reason to believe 
that Aristotle’s version of analogy blazes a trail for Aquinas, there is perhaps even more 
reason to believe that the former philosopher’s metaphysics does the same for Scotus’ 
univocatio . Two key points—one in the Posterior Analytics and the other in 
Categories—provide evidence for this latter claim. 
The first point is Aristotle’s “elevation of substance over being.” 36 In Book II, he 
makes a claim that is also made throughout Metaphysics, namely, that “[b]eing does not 
act as essence to any existing thing, for what it is is not a genus.”37 As we remarked 
before, it is clear that Aristotle is not after some kind of all-encompassing genus; for this 
would mean that his doctrine of primary substance is not the most foundational concept 
in his metaphysics. No, for Aristotle, being qua being is not a genus. Instead, being qua 
being pertains to the thisness—the primary substance—of any particular being. Therefore 
a single analogy—one that would serve as the principle of individuation of all particular 
things—is not a possibility. The fact is that there is an innumerable amount of separate 
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thisness-es for which there is no one common principle. It is the particular being that is 
ultimate in Aristotle’s metaphysics. 
This point leads us to our second: namely, the equality of primary substances 
amongst one another: “[O]f the primary substances one is no more a substance than 
another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox.”38 In other 
words, there is no logical hierarchy among primary substances. Because primary 
substance is itself the most fundamental concept of being, on this level it is not possible 
to raise the question of individuation—a way to logically distinguish the “substance-hood” 
of primary substances. Ultimately, then, Aristotle’s metaphysics posits an equal plane 
upon which all separate primary substances are in the same way and in the same respect. 
While the individual man and the individual ox might serve as focal points for their 
respective analogies across different categories of being, there is no one analogy that is 
capable of providing an explicit explanation for primary substance qua substance.  
Extending Aristotle: Aquinas and Scotus on Analogy 
Although the analogia entis is an instantly recognizable doctrine for those 
familiar with Thomism, the term itself is not used explicitly in the Summa Theologica.39 
Nevertheless, the concept of analogy plays an important role in Aquinas’ work. In order 
to understand what this role is, it is important to note what is perhaps the most obvious 
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difference between the respective metaphysical projects of Aristotle and Aquinas, namely, 
the Christian God.  
 Although it is true that both thinkers engage the problem of the ontological 
difference between being qua being and particular beings, they pursue this difference in 
contrasting ways. For Aristotle, God and/or the gods work within the eternal parameters 
of being; indeed, the gods are generally particular beings who have the power to fashion 
other particular beings in accordance with their (often unpredictable) wills. This is the 
sense in which the Greek God is creator.40 When Aristotle makes theological claims, then, 
he is not making claims about the ontological difference. This is because being qua 
being is the object of metaphysics, not theology.  
 This is not so for Aquinas. Against the Greek notion that “the world and its gods 
were given together,” Aquinas’ Christian monotheism posits God as the source of all 
Being.41 Indeed, on his reading of Genesis 1, the Christian is bound to the idea that God 
creates the world ex nihilo.42 What this means in the context of our inquiry regarding the 
ontological difference is simply this: that the question of being qua being is a question 
with implications for the way in which the Christian God relates himself to his creation.
43
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This union between ontology and theology reflects a fundamental concern for the 
relationship between Creator and creation that is at the heart of the Christian formation of 
the question of ontological difference. The clearest and most explicit rendering of this 
question in Aquinas’ work can be found in Part I, Question 13 of the Summa Theologica, 
which deals with the problem of the predication of God and his creation.  
It is intuitive that Christians know what they mean when they say, for example, 
“God is good.” Indeed, if he were not good, then he would not be God–at least not the 
God with whom they are familiar by way of the incarnation of Christ. At the same time, 
though, Aquinas also seeks to uphold God’s transcendence. In other words, the reality of 
God cannot be contained by human concepts such as goodness or justice; rather, he 
overflows or transcends any such finite attributes. The question is, then: How is it 
possible to talk intelligently about God if he is nothing like human beings have ever 
thought or experienced in full? 
Aquinas wrestles with this question in Part I, Question 13, where he navigates the 
issue using three terms. The first is “univocal” predication, which means something like 
the first perspective described above, namely, that predicates such as “is good” or “is 
wise” can apply to both creatures and God in the same way and in the same respect. On 
this univocal perspective, it is possible to name the attributes of God by looking to our 
finite, created surroundings. Aquinas deems this view problematic for the following 
reasons:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that 
the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. 
Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the 
movement of the Father of light.” See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.9.1. 
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I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The 
reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of 
the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in 
a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects 
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by 
exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior 
things.44 
 
In making his argument against univocity, Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s language of 
causation. When he contends that “caused” things are never quite the same as their cause, 
Aquinas assumes in some sense that the cause or principle of a particular being 
communicates its being to that which is caused. This process of causation is analogous to 
a genetic imprint that the cause lays upon what is caused. While not somehow 
“recreating” itself in its effect, the cause does constitute in part that which is caused. 
Thus, what we have here is a subtle but noticeable emphasis on the primacy of relation as 
a metaphysical principle (as opposed to self-subsistent substance). Instead of one 
hermetically sealed object setting another into motion, thereby enacting the process of 
causation, Aquinas believes that the relation that the caused being maintains with its 
cause is constitutive of that caused being.  
Since such a relation is implicit in being qua being (because God is responsible 
for being qua being), it cannot be the case that particular beings are in the same way and 
in the same respect as their cause, God. From Aquinas’ Christian perspective, the 
position of univocity makes the mistake of attributing the being of the cause to that which 
is caused to a full degree.
45
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So, if univocal predication is problematic, what about equivocal predication, 
which assumes the opposite position—denying any similarity between predicates of God 
and of creatures? Again, Aquinas is critical of such an extreme perspective: “Neither, on 
the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as 
some have said.”46 If equivocal predication is assumed outright, then meaningful speech 
about God is impossible. But this is a direct assault on the integrity of the words of the 
Apostle Paul (among many others), who clearly does not accept such a terrible 
consequence.47 
The solution to this dilemma for Aquinas, then, is his version of analogical 
predication: “Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in 
an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.”48 Unlike univocity and equivocity, 
which bear upon themselves difficult and extreme consequences, analogy represents a via 
media: 
[W]hatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a 
creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-
exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure 
equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in 
univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a 
term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some 
one thing.49 
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Predication of creatures is similar to predication of God, but in a limited sense. 
Simply by being themselves, created things participate in God in different ways and to 
different extents. Instead of understanding the composition of all creation in terms of 
isolated, self-sufficient entities, this analogical vision understands things only in their 
participatory relationship to God. Indeed, the very meaning of being itself is described as 
a relationship to God, who is himself not a being among others.  
To illustrate this point, Aquinas uses a metaphor that is important for his 
understanding of the relationship between the Creator and creation. Like the sun’s 
distribution of heat throughout the earth, God’s attributes are distributed throughout his 
creation in a limited way. After all, the heat of the sun’s surface is different from the heat 
of the sun in an Arizona summer–not only in terms of degree, but also in kind. Although 
the poor souls in Arizona can apply the predicate “is hot” quite intelligibly in their own 
earthly context, that same “is hot” is different for the sun because the sun is the Arizona 
hotness to begin with. Thus, only insofar as this important qualification holds can the 
predicate “is hot” apply to both Arizona and the sun. This is the sense in which it is 
possible to predicate God and particular beings, Creator and creation.  
So what is being qua being, for Aquinas? The short answer is God himself, 
insofar as he is the cause of all particular beings—not a being among others.
50
 Yet, as we 
have seen, it is important to realize that we can talk about God only in terms of analogy. 
This means that particular beings are individuated by a personal, intentional, creative 
power. Ultimately, though, as the language of analogy indicates, the being of particular 
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beings is apophatic in character, meaning that it cannot be “arrived upon” in terms of a 
positive affirmation.51  
While Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that analogy is a metaphysical concept that 
can be used to denote relations across different genus and species, his concept of analogy 
differs from the Stagirite’s in the sense that his entire metaphysics is informed by this 
analogy of participation in the transcendent Creator. By emphasizing the transcendence 
of the Christian God—who is beyond the realm of particular beings—Aquinas has an 
answer for the aforementioned Aristotelian impasse: namely, the problem of the common 
individuation of primary substances. By placing Platonic Forms in the mind of God, 
Aquinas is able to explain more adequately how particular beings can be constituted by 
their respective primary substances.52 This is not to say that Aristotle himself would have 
been somehow certainly “convinced” of Aquinas’ version of the analogy of being. 
Indeed, he might accuse Aquinas of reverting back to the problematic language of 
participation in the Platonic sense.53 Regardless, for these purposes it is most important to 
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note Aquinas’ transformation of Aristotelian substance—from primary substance(s) as an 
end in itself to the hierarchical, participatory relation of creation in its creator, God. 
Perhaps, then, Aquinas’ discussion of analogy can be summed up in the following 
passage from his De Potentia: 
All created causes communicate in one common effect which is being, although 
each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are all differentiated. . . . 
Accordingly, [created causes] have this in common that they cause being, but they 
differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore 
be some cause higher than all others by virtue of which they all cause being and 
whose proper cause is being and this cause is God.54 
 
This is the analogia entis “in a nutshell”—a metaphysics that appropriates Aristotelian 
categories of causation while maintaining the “vertical” participation of particular beings 
in unified transcendence. As we move forward to the next few chapters of our argument 
about univocity and analogy and the analytic-continental divide, it will become evident 
how this shift of emphasis from primary substance to participatory relation functions as a 
distinctive characteristic of continental as opposed to analytic philosophy.  
 This is, of course, an incomplete picture of Aquinas’ intricate metaphysics, but it 
suffices for defining Aquinas’ analogy of being as a metaphysical claim about the 
meaning of being qua being. Now we may attempt to solidify the distinction between 
analogy and univocity by turning to Aquinas’ most notorious counterpart on the subject, 
John Duns Scotus. Of course, by “counterpart,” I do not mean that the two philosophers 
consciously wrote against one another’s respective positions. This was historically 
impossible, since Scotus was only a boy when Aquinas died, and Scotus’ clearly 
identifies as his opponent Henry of Ghent, not Aquinas. Still, Aquinas and Scotus are 
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nevertheless counterparts in a more strictly philosophical sense insofar as they espouse 
most articulately two distinct positions on the nature and status of analogy with respect to 
the question of being qua being.    
 Regarding the problem of predication of God and creatures, Henry draws 
attention to the fact that any given predicate (i.e. “is good” or “is wise”) can be 
understood in multiple senses. To illustrate this point, consider the following sentences: 
(1) “The chess player is good,” and (2) “The food is good.” In the first case, the predicate 
seems to be modifying the subject in terms of her ability to win a game called chess. In 
the second case, the predicate modifies the subject in terms of the extent of its 
deliciousness. While the Aristotelian four-term analogy might represent a way to make 
sense of this predicate as it is applied in such different senses, Henry instead wants to 
emphasize the different senses as ultimately uncommon in accordance with the different 
subjects they modify. Thus, because Henry affirms that God’s being is expressed in a 
different sense than his creature’s being, it would seem to follow that univocity in 
predication between God and creatures is impossible.55   
 It is in response to this theory that Scotus begins to discuss the univocity of being. 
In his Ordinatio, he makes a case for univocal predication of God and creatures “in some 
concept.”56 This latter qualification is important, as it is not his intention to do away with 
analogy altogether. With characteristic clarity, Scotus defines what he takes to be 
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univocity: “I designate that concept univocal which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so 
that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction.”57 This 
definition is relatively straightforward. A single predicate can be applied univocally to 
different subjects if it is a contradiction to both affirm and negate it as it pertains to the 
same subject.  
 For example, if we say that (1) Socrates is a man; and (2) Socrates is not a man, 
we seem to have contradicted ourselves. But this may not be the case at all. If the 
predicate “is a man” is employed in different senses, then there may not be a 
contradiction. Perhaps Socrates belongs to the species of “man”, but nevertheless “is not 
a man” in some other colloquial sense (he is cowardly, does not like baseball, etc.). 
However, if in fact we apply the predicate “is a man” in the same sense to both (1) and 
(2), then there is no choice but to admit of a contradiction. If this is so, then we have an 
example of univocal predication. Thus, applied to God’s being, the crux of Scotus’ 
question might go something like this: Is it a contradiction to say that (1) God is; and (2) 
God is not? If the answer is yes, then on this definition some theory of univocity must be 
true. Aside from this point, Scotus has four arguments for his position of univocity. For 
sake of space I shall limit the current scope of analysis to the first argument, which is the 
clearest and most accessible case for the univocity of being.  
 The first argument is an attempt to “dig out” a concept of being that is not entirely 
constituted by the hierarchical relation between God and creatures. In order for being to 
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be univocal in some sense, it needs to have a structural integrity in and of itself. The 
argument proceeds in the following manner:
58
 
(1) Every intellect that is certain about one concept, but dubious about others has, 
in addition to the concepts about which it is in doubt, another concept of 
which it is certain. . . .  
(2) [A] man can be certain in his mind that God is a being and still be in doubt 
whether He is a finite or an infinite being, a created or uncreated being. 
(3) Consequently, the concept of “being” as affirmed of God is different from the 
other two concepts but is included in both of them and therefore is univocal.59 
 
The first (and less controversial) premise here is a claim about the way in which human 
minds ought to conceive of concepts. In this case, because there is a definite difference 
between “certain” and “dubious” concepts in the mind, the two cannot be identical in 
terms of their respective properties—even if the only non-mutual property is its 
“certainty” (or lack thereof).  
 The second premise is not so easy to accept—and indeed some might accuse 
Scotus of assuming what he is trying to prove: namely, that God’s being can, in some 
sense, be meaningfully abstracted from the particular analogy between transcendent 
Creator and immanent creation. When Scotus says that is possible to be “certain” that 
God is a being but not that He is infinite, he implies that God’s being is foundational to 
his other properties (i.e. His infinite being).  
 In other words, as his conclusion states, God’s being is “included” in all of his 
other properties but not identical to them. This is the way in which God’s being can be 
applied univocally—as a logically meaningful concept serving as a foundation for all 
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other properties. This point is important because it allows us to understand Scotus’ 
position on analogy. 
 There is no question that Scotus’ univocatio, by allowing for univocal predication 
between God and creatures, differs greatly from Aquinas’ analogia. Again, however, this 
is not to say that Scotus wants to do away with analogy altogether. On the contrary, his 
theory of univocity is meant to salvage the intelligibility of analogy. For Scotus believes 
that unless there exists a middle term that is univocally predicated of two different 
subjects, then any analogy is doomed to equivocity.60 Indeed, it seems that Scotus’ 
univocity is supposed to serve as a prior consideration (even a “certain” one) for the sake 
of any theory of analogy.  
 Based on our brief historical sketch of, we have reasonable definitions for our 
terms analogy and univocity. If being qua being is fundamentally analogous, then to say 
particular beings are is to say that they are in relationship to that which transcends the 
order of particular beings. It is this order that is metaphysically primary—not the 
individual substance or thisness of particular beings. By contrast, if being is 
fundamentally univocal, then being qua being is a concept that can be thought in some 
way without reference to its contingency upon such a participatory relation. On this view, 
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any such relation is dependent upon the metaphysical “bottom line” of being qua being as 
a “certain” concept. 
 In the next few chapters, we will examine the divide between continental and 
analytic philosophy in light of the positions of analogia and univocatio, respectively. In 
order to do so, I have selected three different case studies that can and ought to be read in 
this way.  
Case Study 1: Gilbert Ryle and Martin Heidegger 
The work of British philosopher Gilbert Ryle maintains an important relationship 
with fellow giant of twentieth century thought, Martin Heidegger. This relationship, 
while tenuous at times, marks a significant situation in philosophy—especially regarding 
the philosophical “orthodoxy” of the twentieth century, the analytic-continental divide.61 
While it is true that neither thinker aligns himself explicitly with either of the two schools, 
there are both rhetorical and substantive differences between the two that may offer 
concrete insight into a fundamental disagreement between the two traditions. Indeed, the 
two philosophers are emblematic of these respective traditions in the twentieth century. 
It is important to understand that Ryle and Heidegger are united in their antipathy 
towards Cartesian mind-body dualism.62 In fact, both Ryle’s and Heidegger’s respective 
philosophical projects revolve around their criticism of Cartesian dualism. For this reason, 
Ryle has been read as a proponent of phenomenology along with Heidegger.63 My 
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primary purpose in this case study, however, is to say that the two thinkers are 
diametrically opposed in terms of their view of b 
eing qua being. Drawing from his review of Heidegger's Being and Time,64 I 
attempt here to show that Ryle's concern for the “things themselves” reveals his 
affirmation of the Scotist doctrine of the univocity of being. For Ryle, being is not 
ultimately analogous to an order that is beyond the realm of particular beings, but instead 
it is a unified concept under which things are in common. It is on the basis of this 
univocal ontology that Ryle erects his famous distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that.
65
 With this distinction, his differs fundamentally from from Heidegger's 
project of phenomenological ontology precisely because he affirms univocity while 
Heidegger does not.   
 The structure of the present case study takes the form of a defense of the 
following line of reasoning: First, I attempt to show that, in Being and Time, Heidegger 
assumes a fundamentally analogical concept of being. In doing so, he establishes 
phenomenology as not only a distinct philosophical method but also as an ontology. 
Second, I will maintain that Ryle’s project (less controversially) assumes a univocal 
ontology. It is therefore the conclusion of this study that this fundamental dissimilarity—
the difference between analogy and univocity—represents the most substantive 
disagreement between the respective projects of Heidegger and Ryle.    
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As some philosophers have noted, there is “a substantial affinity between [Ryle’s 
and Heidegger’s] works.”66 While the work of the two thinkers certainly overlaps to 
some degree, it would be misleading to gloss over their more substantial disagreements. 
In order to begin understanding this complicated relationship, it is important to examine 
the most evident agreement between the two philosophers in detail, namely, that the 
Cartesian separation of mind and body is mistaken.  
 When Descartes embarks upon his mission of locating a “certain” foundation for 
philosophy, he arrives upon his famous dictum, cogito ergo sum. Establishing the 
thinking self as philosophical bedrock privileges the realm of the “mind”, which deals 
essentially with thought as opposed to an “external world” that exists independently of 
thought. For Descartes, it is possible to doubt that there is an external world with which 
we are in contact as “thinking things”, but it is not possible to doubt that there must be an 
existing 'I' that does the thinking in the first place.
67
 After all, even thoughts of doubt 
must come from an existing thinker. In this way, the realm of thought has at least one 
property that the external world does not: certain existence. This separation between 
thought and the external world is important for Descartes, who is concerned with doing 
philosophy on the unshakable foundation of certainty. The price paid for this 
achievement is the mind-body dualism traditionally associated with Descartes. 
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  In what has become a famous section of Being and Time, Heidegger responds to 
Descartes by accusing him of neglecting the most important question that a philosopher 
can ask: “What is the meaning of being in general?”68 For Heidegger, the Cartesian 
methodology of doubt is helpful, but only if it is applied to every aspect of Descartes’ 
epistemological project. Whereas Descartes offers a great amount of clarity and precision 
regarding his understanding of the cogito, he does not say anything at all about the nature 
or meaning of the sum.69 He seems to assume that meaning of existence or being is either 
already settled or unworthy of philosophical reflection due to its resistance to meaningful 
predication. In either case, Heidegger understands the division between cogito and sum to 
be unhelpfully asymmetrical because it overemphasizes the “I think” of the formula. 
Such a focus leads inevitably to a privileging of thought over all else that exists 
independently of thought. Worse, it “covers up” the more fundamental question of being 
in general. The question of the meaning of sum is more fundamental than the question of 
rationalist certainty because—whether it is explicit or not—it pertains to both sides of the 
issue, cogito and sum.  
Heidegger's own project begins (and remains) with the meaning of sum. His 
attempt to give primacy to this question “clears the way”70 for his holistic project of 
phenomenological ontology. It is Heidegger's contention that a robust understanding of 
the meaning of being in general makes a dualism between mind and body untenable.  
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 By contrast, Ryle's critique of Cartesian dualism is a “linguistic portrayal or 
sentence-frame analysis; his goal is not a science or a clarification of the meaning of 
Being, but rather a ‘theory of mind’ or philosophical psychology.”71 Instead of 
challenging the entire paradigm of metaphysical language in general, as does Heidegger, 
Ryle aims to show that the Cartesian position makes a category mistake in the 
understanding of mental states. For Ryle, a substance dualism between mind and body 
commits itself to a theory of action in which “mind states” are little more than “occult 
episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects.”72 Ryle thus charges 
Descartes with positing a sort of mystical parallel world of “thought” that somehow 
interacts with the categorically separate realm of action in the external world. Ryle's 
alternative is to view this realm of thought as just another manifestation of action, and 
therefore not different in any substantive way from acts in the external world. As we will 
see later, Ryle justifies this charge with his famous distinction between knowing-how and 
knowing-that.  
 In sum, Heidegger and Ryle share the conviction that the Cartesian position of 
substance dualism is symptomatic of a more fundamental philosophical mistake. But this 
is where their commonalities end. For Heidegger, addressing this problem requires an 
explicit reexamination of metaphysics and the meaning of being in general. Ryle, by 
contrast, only seeks to expose a category mistake within an already accepted language of 
metaphysics. In order to understand this point, it is necessary to come to what I think is 
the most fundamental disagreement between Heidegger and Ryle: the univocity of being.   
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 As our analysis of Scotus’ position of univocity has shown, the idea of univocity 
implies the self-sufficiency of particular beings. We saw that univocity obtains on the 
sole condition that simultaneously to affirm and deny some predicate results in a 
contradiction. The position of analogy would complicate this situation in the sense that 
objects only have objecthood insofar as they maintain relations with that to which they 
are analogous. Univocity resists this relational understanding of particular beings, 
positing them as self-sufficient instead.  
This univocal self-sufficiency of particular beings is exactly what Heidegger's 
phenomenological ontology aims to abolish in Being and Time. Although it is true that 
Heidegger's governing question about the meaning of being in general may seem as 
though it implies this univocity as the goal, it is important to note that only analogy can 
even come close to the language necessary for such a project. Heidegger schoar Thomas 
Sheehan remarks cogently: 
[T]alk of Being 'itself' can easily lose sight of the analogical character of Being. 
Heidegger was not after a univocal something that subsists on its own. Over and 
above the Being of man, the Being implements, nature, artworks and ideal objects, 
there is no second level of 'Being itself.' Rather, the 'itself' refers to the 
analogically unified meaning of Being which is instantiated in all cases of Being 
this or that.73 
 
Read in this way, Heidegger's project does share the importance of analogous being with 
Aquinas. It would be a dreadful mistake, however, to say that he is a Thomist.  
 Whereas Aquinas unifies his analogous understanding of being by appealing to 
the absolute contingency of the created order upon its Creator for theological reasons, 
Heidegger cannot accept this metaphysical structure. In Heidegger's phenomenology, 
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being names the majestic, dynamic process that is always-already both revealing and 
concealing itself actively as temporality.74 It encompasses the entirety of not only 
“objective reality”75 but also the equally important interpretative activity by which that 
reality is itself also constituted—not in a subjectivist, ego-centered way, but rather via the 
grander movement of history. Heidegger names the being who performs this 
interpretation Dasein (literally, there-being) in an attempt to understand the conscious 
self as inextricable from the question of being. Again, this integrative understanding is in 
direct opposition to any dualism between a subjective mind and the objective world. 
Instead, being is always manifesting itself and re-manifesting itself on its own terms of 
unceasing, holistic flux. The ontological significance of Dasein’s engagement with the 
world—“seeing as”—is not supposed to entail some a solipsism; rather, Dasein should be 
understood simply as the vehicle through which being reveals itself. In Heidegger, contra 
Descartes, the self is subservient to being.76  
 When he analyzes things like “mood” and “anxiety”, then, Heidegger does not 
evoke the same sentiment typical of existentialist philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre.77 
Heidegger is not interested in parading his subjectivity about the academy like a 
heartbroken teenage girl in a high school creative writing class. Instead, he is sketching 
certain fundamental modes of being in general—or, perhaps more simply, the ways in 
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which being discloses itself via the interpretive particularity of temporal Dasein. For 
Heidegger, it is misleading to say, “I feel anxiety”; for this simply names an emotive state 
that characterizes a feeling subject over against its external world. It is more correct to 
say “being reveals itself as anxious Dasein.”78 This is significant for the context of our 
overall discussion about Thomistic analogy. Unlike Aquinas, Heidegger lacks the 
traditional metaphysical semantics of necessity and contingency. Still, his language is 
still profoundly indebted to analogy as both a fundamental methodology and even at the 
substantive level of ontology itself.  
 Because phenomenology in a thoroughgoing sense is attuned to the idea that “the 
access of meaning is part of the meaning itself,”79 Any final, univocal account of being is 
hard to come by. In such a paradigm, relationality is an inescapable part of what it means 
for objects to be accessed by someone at sometime. This point about Heidegger’s 
resistance to univocity, however, has come under attack in Philip Tonner's recent book, 
Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being.80 In it, Tonner makes the opposite 
claim: that Heidegger's understanding of being is not analogous at all but ultimately 
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univocal. Tonner’s central claim is that Heidegger's conception of temporality functions 
similarly to Scotus' concept of univocity. Although it is couched in a non-metaphysical 
language of “thinking” as opposed to a traditional metaphysics of causation this notion of 
temporality ultimately serves as a “bottom line” all existing things without an appeal to 
analogy: “Dasein's temporality is revealed as the transcendental horizon for the 
understanding of being. As such, all being is understood in terms of time. To that extent, 
being is univocally understood in terms of time and being itself is temporal.”81 
 
It is certainly true that Heidegger's understanding of temporality provides an 
overarching horizon for all existing beings, but Tonner is too hasty to associate 
Heidegger’s emphasis on temporality with univocity. Sheehan’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s philosophy as fundamentally analogical is more convincing for one simple 
reason: Heidegger’s phenomenological account of temporality is unique in the sense that 
it is composed of possibility. Possibility in Heidegger is a complex and easily 
misunderstood concept, but it is extremely important to his phenomenology. Roughly 
stated, Heidegger holds that things are in the world only insofar as they are there for 
something else and ultimately for Dasein. Keeping in mind the earlier phenomenological 
dictum that the access of meaning is part of the meaning itself, any understanding of 
existing beings must include a certain possibility for the “accessor”, Dasein.  
 Heidegger's famous example of the hammer in Being and Time is an excellent 
illustration of this point.82 It would be very odd, he argues, for the craftsman to assess his 
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hammer as an objectively present thing that stands in opposition to his subjectivity. A 
craftsman never “stops” to think about what the hammer is in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. This would be a difficult and unnecessary task. Rather, the 
craftsman “knows” his hammer only insofar as his hammer maintains a certain 
possibility—namely, the possibility of fulfilling the craftsman's activity of the craft. 
Moreover, what the hammer is becomes known only by using it. The more the hammer is 
used, the more primordial our relation to it becomes, and the more unconcealed becomes 
its nature, i.e. its usefulness for a project. Sure, if the hammer malfunctions or performs a 
function that is somehow out of the ordinary, the craftsman may stop and examine it—
perhaps even for certain properties it may or may not possess. But this new reflective 
attitude that the craftsman adopts in relation to his hammer is likewise constituted by a 
new possibility of “fixing” or perhaps “admiring”. The phenomenological perspective is 
still maintained—just in terms of new possibilities.  
 For Heidegger, this account of beings as for the possibility of x extends to not only 
tools but literally to everything that Dasein encounters. Even something as apparently 
arid or benign as mathematics can never be a simply “objective” (as opposed to the 
subjective enterprise of which the interpretive mode of possibility is not a part). So, while 
temporality provides a certain clearing in which possibilities are to be made intelligible, it 
seems difficult to escape the idea that such a temporality cannot be “arrived upon” in any 
meaningful way without both the revelatory activity of being through Dasein and the 
specific instantiations of the possibilities themselves. The linguistic discipline of analogy 
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is essential to this phenomenological enterprise because relation is more primordial than 
the particular beings in themselves.83 
 For these reasons, then, it should be clear that Heidegger’s phenomenological 
account of human knowing, of our relation to the world, does not entail a univocal 
ontology of being qua being. Thus, because Ryle has a univocal account of being, Ryle is 
not a proponent of Heideggerian phenomenology. Heidegger’s phenomenology 
emphasizes the primordiality of relation over the self-sufficiency of particular 
beings, and is analogical in this sense. I will now attempt to show how Ryle maintains 
a univocal ontology.  
 Ryle begins his most well-known book, The Concept of Mind, with an analysis of 
the aforementioned “myth” of Cartesian dualism. Calling it “the official doctrine” of 
most philosophy in his era and before, he polemically engages it: 
With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has 
both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both 
a body and a mind. His body and mind are harnessed together, but after the death 
of the body his mind may continue to exist and function.84 
 
There are more than a few details to unpack from this seemingly simple quotation, but 
perhaps the most important one for these purposes is the dubious origin of the dualism in 
question. As Ryle goes on to say, the mind-body distinction is relevant not only in terms 
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of an isolated issue of theoretical metaphysics, but in a whole host of other classic 
distinctions (i.e. subjective-objective, private-public, etc.).  
 According to Ryle, the best way to understand the reasons for holding such a view 
of human identity and consciousness is as a myth that accomplishes “a lot of theoretical 
good, while [it is] still new.”85 To illustrate this curious point, he draws on the classical 
metaphor of the mind as a ruling body or political superior. This picture of the mind as 
naturally distinct from the body is employed in certain schools of ancient philosophy in 
order to legitimate a certain kind of regime in which a few leaders could efficiently rule 
their polis. The wise leaders represent the mind, of course, and the body politic represents 
the body. In this way, the theory accomplishes a certain good (for the aristocrats) even if 
it does not necessarily correspond with reality. For Ryle, such an accidentally progressive 
result of philosophical theories can also occur towards the end of more desirable answers 
to difficult questions.  
 For Ryle, then, philosophy operates like the natural sciences—with a progressive 
account of knowledge that builds upon its predecessors. This “scientific” philosophy is 
interesting not only because of its explicit affinity for the empirically focused Anglo-
American tradition of analytic philosophy, but also because it informs Ryle's critical 
attitude towards phenomenology proper. Again in The Concept of Mind, he dedicates a 
section to what he calls “phenomenalism”.86 In it, he makes two remarks about this 
burgeoning philosophical movement—one of admiration, and one critical. 
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 “One of the commendable motives of this theory was the desire to dispense with 
occult agencies and principles. . . . Its holders found that current theories of perception 
postulated unobservable entities or factors to endow things with properties which 
sensations were debarred from revealing.”87 Here, Ryle simply means the Aristotelian 
notion of primary substance. Because he understands phenomenalism to be concerned 
with the manner in which things appear rather than the unchanging thisness of the thing 
appearing, on this paradigm there is no room for these kinds of “occult principles”—
concepts that are not amenable to empirical investigation. Perhaps it is not difficult, then, 
to see why Ryle maintains some overlap with this philosophical approach. Like the 
mysterious “other realm” of the mind that is opposed to the body, ideas such as substance 
and essence assume a mythical status in relation to the rest of reality. Because Ryle 
critiques this dualism as an empty illusion, it follows that he is also critical of these 
classical ideas as well. In this limited sense, then, Ryle again shares common ground with 
philosophical phenomenalism.  
 Yet while this agreement ought not to be dismissed altogether, the appearances 
are far more interesting than the substance. It is true that the phenomenological method 
does away with finalized substance and essence by understanding the “thing” as 
something like a differentiated appearance. But if this is supposed to be a distinctive 
feature of phenomenalism, then it is difficult to see how such a philosophy gets beyond 
the more traditional British empiricist projects of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Empiricists such as David Hume, among many others, famously criticize the 
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ancient ideas of substance in a strikingly similar manner.88 It seems that Ryle's supposed 
affinity with what he calls phenomenalism is better understood as a rather ordinary 
overlap with his basic empiricism.  
 However, while this agreement regarding the untenable idea of substance or 
essence is surely relevant to the respective projects at issue, it is Ryle's disagreement with 
phenomenalism that has far more impact on his philosophy as a whole. He writes in that 
same section that phenomenalism mistakenly “supposed that having a sensation is itself a 
finding of something, . . . since we can observe only sensible objects, propositions about 
gate-posts [Ryle's example] must be translatable to propositions about sensible objects.”89 
Instead of liberating itself from the Aristotelian myth of primary substance, Ryle’s 
project remains steadfastly in its linguistic framework of subject-predicate. The only 
difference is that—instead of admitting the unobservable phenomena—it attempts to 
translate all propositions about gate-posts into propositions about sensible objects. 
Whereas Aristotle has said that the gate-post has a certain logical status as a unified, 
particular being, the phenomenologist says instead that the very notion of that “essential 
property” is itself an experiential phenomenon.  
 But what exactly is Ryle's problem here? The answer is, simply, that there is no 
such thing as a “sensible object” in the first place. This is a category mistake because it is 
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non-sensical “to call a sensation 'veridical' [or] mistaken.”90 A sensation simply is a self-
sufficient given—without constitutive relation to the existing thing in question. It cannot 
be true or false because truth and falsehood gain their respective meanings from the 
world itself. This perspective already hints at a univocal account of being in that it refers 
to truth and falsehood of things independently of their phenomenological sensation or 
appearance. In order to explore this point further, however, it is necessary to examine 
Ryle's notable epistemological distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. 
 “Knowing-How and Knowing-That” is Ryle's most explicit attempt to 
problematize the Cartesian dualism between the “purely intellectual” act of thought and 
“external” acts of considering propositions. Following Aristotle, Ryle argues that 
“philosophers have not done justice to the distinction that is part of our common sense: 
the difference between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do 
things.”91 To illustrate this point, Ryle draws upon the image of a chess player. When we 
say that a chess player is “clever”, we do not simply mean that he knows more 
propositions than a “stupid” player—as though stupidity and cleverness were merely 
descriptive terms referencing the amount of things known by each possessing subject. If 
this were the case, then we would reach an awkward conclusion: namely, that the stupid 
player would become clever simply by virtue of memorizing a list of the best possible 
moves. Ryle argues that this is not cleverness at all, but simply a robotic adherence to a 
set of known propositions.  
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 On behalf of the “intellectualist” Cartesians, he anticipates an objection to this 
understanding: could it not be the case that the stupid player's memorization of certain 
moves is not knowledge at all but simply “habit”? To this, Ryle responds with two points. 
Even if the stupid player takes the time to learn—not just memorize—the moves 
available, he would still need to (1) tell himself the appropriate move at the moment 
when it was needed and (2) act accordingly when the move occurs to him. Because this is 
the case, he concludes that “the application of maxims, etc., is certainly not any mere 
contemplation of them. Equally certainly it can be intelligently or stupidly done.”92 This 
idea—that propositions are known in a certain way—is the fundamental idea of what 
Ryle means by “knowledge-how”.  
 Although some philosophers have accused Ryle of reducing all knowledge to 
knowledge-how,
93
 this is not the intent of his project. Regardless of whether or not he is 
logically clear and consistent with his definition of knowing-that, it is safe to say that this 
kind of knowledge is best understood with the metaphor of possession or accumulation. 
The chess player's unique disposition of intelligence is knowing-how, to be sure, but he 
must also have a “database of moves” that falls under the category of knowing-that. Like 
tools in his arsenal, he wields them cleverly in order to win the game—but in order to do 
that, he must possess them in the first place.  
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 Again, this seems to be further evidence of Ryle's adherence to a univocal account 
ontology. The language of possession demands an atomic, independent presence for both 
the possessor and the possessed. It would be incorrect to say, for example, that the chess 
player is his arsenal of moves. On the contrary, the chess player is the chess player on 
account of his being different enough from the moves to be able to possess them. The 
same could be said from the opposite perspective. The chess moves are not the chess 
player; they exist quite happily without him in many possible worlds. This is because 
they are different enough from the player to be possessed. Therefore knowledge-that is 
not an analogical disposition of the chess player's integrated reality—far from it. It is 
instead the self-sufficient, atomic content that is only contingently possessed by the 
knower. True to the “Logical Atomist mood,”94 Ryle is interested in things-in-themselves. 
This latter focus is of interest to his analysis of Heidegger himself in his review of Being 
and Time.  
 Ryle begins his review without mincing words: “I suspect that this advance [of 
phenomenology] is an advance towards disaster.”95 Although he also offers some praise 
to go along with his criticism, Ryle is not shy about distancing himself from Heidegger's 
grand project. There are numerous reasons for this, but the most interesting for my 
purposes is the presence—or lack thereof—of knowledge-that (or things themselves). 
Things qua things must be preserved in Ryle's system so that his knowledge-
how/knowledge-that distinction can maintain its integrity. Without the conceptual 
resource of things-in-themselves, it is impossible for Ryle to justify the status of 
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knowledge-that because there is simply no need for it. Knowledge-how would be quite 
sufficient for describing all knowledge. Indeed, this lapse into such a phenomenological 
or relational monism is the “disaster” of which Ryle speaks.  
 In his analysis of Heidegger's own account of knowledge, he offers the following 
critique: 
But while it is a dangerous metaphor to speak of acts having "meanings" or of 
things as being the "meanings of acts", it is a fatal error to speak of a thing known 
as the correlate of a knowing-act as if that implied that we could get to the heart 
of the thing by analyzing our experience of knowing it. A twin is a correlate to a 
twin but operations upon the one are at most operations upon the other one's twin, 
not operations upon the other one himself.96 
 
For Ryle, Heidegger’s reducing of all knowledge to the “primitive” adverbial language of 
being-in-the-world makes it extremely difficult to speak of knowing “things” at all—
unless, of course, one is willing to admit that knowledge is simply reducible to the 
various interpretive dispositions of Dasein. This is simply not a philosophical move with 
which Ryle is comfortable. “Being-in-the-world surely implies that underlying our other 
reactions and attitudes there is knowledge. We are in-the-world only if we know that at 
least one 'something' exists.”97  
 Even if he does depart from the Cartesian dualism that provides much of the 
objective ground for science, Ryle's affinities still lie firmly with the classic empiricist 
narrative of progress and accumulation of knowledge. As I have already argued, the 
Scotist doctrine of univocity is the most fundamental metaphysical presupposition for this 
epistemological imagination. Because being is a universally binding concept which all 
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existing things have in common, there is no need to refer to any such necessary being (i.e. 
the Thomist God or Heideggerian Dasein) as constitutive of things. This common 
understanding of the being of beings liberates individual things from the monist 
inclination of the analogous knowledge-how. In its place, Ryle’s univocity postulates 
being as a self-sufficient concept that simply names something like the presence of a 
thing—indifferent to the knower's action in the world.   
 This is the sense in which the Kantian “thing-in-itself” depends on this 
understanding.98 Following Kant and the narrative of modern science, then, Ryle 
maintains a univocal ontology. His concept of knowledge-that depends on it. Because a 
thoroughgoing phenomenology relies upon an analogical understanding of being qua 
being, Ryle is himself not a phenomenologist as Heidegger is.  
 It is true that Ryle’s project is similar to Heidegger’s in that each philosopher is a 
fierce critic of the Cartesian separation between mind and body. Upon further 
examination, however, this mutuality is barely more than superficial. Whereas 
Heidegger's project is an entire revamping of the orientation of metaphysics altogether, 
Ryle's is a more subdued critique that simply attempts to salvage both parts of his 
epistemic distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.  
 The metaphysical claims of the univocity of being and phenomenology are 
mutually exclusive because the latter is only possible as a project only via the language of 
analogy. Instead of appointing one concept of being to all existing things as a genus, a 
phenomenological ontology follows Aristotle and Aquinas by understanding being qua 
being only insofar as it is revealed in particular beings—never as an abstract concept in 
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itself. Although the phenomenologist does not share the Thomistic language of a single 
“necessary being”, it does relativize being according to its phenomenal appearance. For 
Heidegger, this means understanding things in terms of their manifold possibilities for 
Dasein.  
 I have also attempted to show that Ryle's break with Heidegger is most 
fundamentally his affirmation of the Scotist doctrine of the univocity of being. This is 
evidenced in his various critiques of phenomenology—especially in his review of 
Heidegger's Being and Time. Ryle is wary of phenomenology's “reductionist” tendency to 
collapse the entire enterprise of knowledge into the realm of mere subjective disposition. 
As an alternative, he advocates an epistemological position of both knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that. It is the latter that marks his specific departure from phenomenology and 
analogy because it requires the existence of free-standing entities that can simply possess 
their being without reference to its phenomenal appearance.  
 However consistent or inconsistent his definition of knowledge-that stands, it 
does place him in the atomist tradition of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. This 
divergence sheds some light upon the fundamental disagreements of the two. Insofar as 
continental philosophy follows Heidegger's commitment to exploring the contingent 
conditions upon which the meanings of even the most perennial philosophical concepts 
rely,
99
 it cannot accommodate a strictly univocal understanding of being. This seems to 
be true of not only the phenomenology and existentialism of the mid-twentieth century 
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but also to later developments in hermeneutics and post-structuralist discourse. 
Conversely, although analytic philosophers are obviously not blind to such contingent 
conditions, their resistance to subsuming meaning itself to mere analogy assumes the 
opposite position of univocity. 
 By being articulate about this fundamental difference maintained between the 
philosophical projects of Gilbert Ryle and Martin Heidegger, it is possible to garner a 
fuller understanding of both—as individual philosophers and as representatives of two 
wide-ranging traditions of philosophy. Now we turn to our second of three case studies, 
the debate between two philosophers of language, Jacques Derrida and John Searle. As 
continental and analytic philosophers, respectively, this debate represents just how 
different the implications of such a divide are.  
Case Study II: The Question of Iterability: Jacques Derrida and John Searle 
 The Derrida-Searle debate is not only one of the most paradigmatic clashes 
between continental and analytic philosophers, but it is also one of the most recognizable 
displays of the divide’s fragmentary effect on philosophy. The debate hinges upon some 
recurring fundamental issues that characterize the divide as a whole, and is fragmented 
because the lack of respect with which each philosopher treats his counterpart affects the 
standard of discourse in non-discrete ways. 
 The debate begins with Derrida’s essay, “Signature, Event, Context,” which is a 
brief but pointed critique of J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory. It is Derrida’s contention 
that Austin, in How to Do Things with Words, correctly criticizes Western philosophy’s 
tendency to over-emphasize the importance of sentences with identifiable truth values. 
Taking his cue from the earlier Ludwig Wittgenstein, Austin aims to interrogate the 
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nature of language not primarily in terms of “sense and reference,” but rather in terms of 
a specific mode of action—what Wittgenstein might call “meaning as use.”100 Hence, 
“speech-act” theory understands language to be primarily about communicative activity 
as activity between an intentional subject and a receiver rather than claims that can be 
judged to be true or false according to logical consistency and empirical verification.  
 Derrida applauds this approach, but he does not feel that speech-act theory is 
aware enough of its own ontological presuppositions, which manifest themselves as an 
undue privileging of speech over writing. Indeed, Derrida begins developing this theme 
by quoting Austin: “[S]till confining ourselves for simplicity to spoken utterance.”101 By 
speech and writing, Derrida does not simply mean the difference between personal 
interaction involving voices or penciled marks on paper; rather, he uses the images of 
speech and writing to illustrate what he perceives to be far deeper ontological 
commitments that are more difficult to name in themselves. Because this is one of 
Derrida’s central themes—and one of the most important differences he maintains with 
Austin and Searle—we will explore it in more detail in the body of the case study.  
   As a disciple of Austin and an advocate of speech-act theory himself, Searle felt 
it worthwhile to respond to Derrida in his own essay entitled “Reiterating the 
Differences.” Taking issue with what he perceives as Derrida’s simplistic account of the 
difference between speech and writing (and the supposed privilege of the former over the 
latter), Searle holds that “a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the 
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corresponding (intentional) speech act.”102  
 This response triggered the vitriolic exchange between the two philosophers—
including most notably the lengthy Limited, Inc. by Derrida and the sarcastically titled 
“Literary Theory and Its Discontents” by Searle. In the following we examine the debate  
thematically as an analysis of three pivotal points at which it is possible to locate deep 
and fundamental differences between the two: namely (1) the speech vs. writing problem, 
(2) the relationship between intentionality and meaning, and (3) the concept of iterability. 
Finally, after this analysis, we will examine all three in terms of our developed concepts 
of analogy and univocity.  
 The first and most important disagreement between Derrida and Searle is the 
ontological significance of the distinction between speech and writing, if there is such a 
thing. In order to do so, Derrida follows Heidegger by addressing the way in which the 
Western metaphysical tradition has employed the word 'being'. In his landmark essay 
“Differance,” Derrida adopts a modified version of Heidegger's phenomenological 
ontology. Like Heidegger, Derrida acknowledges the aforementioned “ontological 
difference” between particular beings and being qua being. Unlike Heidegger, however, 
he applies this method to the discourse of structural linguistics, which had previously 
understood language as a system of signs whose meaning arises only via timeless 
“difference.”103 This “temporalization” of Saussure's system paves the way for the 
enigma of “differance” that is so central to Derrida's thought.  
                                                                    
102
 John Searle, “Reiterating the Differences,” Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1977), 202.  
103
 See Jacques Derrida, “Differance,” From Modernism to Postmodernism, 230. French structuralism's 
main contention, as articulated most clearly in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, is that “there are only 
Harris   57 
He begins his essay with an analysis of the verb, “to differ”. There are two 
meanings to this word: “On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, 
or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay . . . a spacing and 
temporalizing.”104 The former sense of “to differ” is the foundation of Saussurean 
structural linguistics. Signs are meaningful insofar as they are distinct or discernable from 
one another. It is the second meaning—“the interposition of delay”—that is unique to 
Derrida’s project. According to Derrida, meaning arises out of a “play” between these 
two meanings of differ. “Differance” is an attempt to name that which “relates the two 
movements of differing to each other.”105 Differ[a]nce is not differ[e]nce because the 
latter already is already implicated in the timeless framework of structural linguistics, the 
first meaning of “to differ”. Neither is differance strictly limited to the possibility-driven 
activity of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, as in Heideggerian phenomenology. It is, in a 
sense, a combination of both.  
Differance does not even exist at all; for already this would be to describe it in 
terms of a particular being among others. Instead, differance is the absence which creates 
the possibility for all that is present in its particularity. Differ[a]nce is the mystery that 
functions together with differ[e]nce to effect meaning in language. 
The development of “difference” is crucial to Derrida’s particular understanding 
of the preeminence of writing over speech—especially in the context of his debate with 
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Searle. In a passage that is about as close as Derrida ever gets to defining a single term 
succinctly and clearly, he says the following about writing:  
In order for my ‘written communication’ to retain its function as writing, i.e., its 
readability, it must remain readable despite the absolute disappearance of any 
receiver, determined in general. . . . A writing that is not structurally readable—
iterable—beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing.106 
 
The key point here is that the ontological significance of writing is constituted at least in 
part by its lack of a present author and receiver. If writing were dependent on an 
objectively present author and receiver, it would be difficult to ascertain any meaning 
from a written text if the author and receiver were unknown. But clearly it is possible to 
understand a written text without knowing its author and intended recipient. Perhaps an 
obvious example of this is sacred Scriptures such as the Bible. While there are not always 
scientifically satisfying ways of identifying the “real” author of a text like Genesis, there 
is still much to be gained from each text within the hermeneutical circles of the 
Abrahamic faith communities, among others. 
 If it is true that the presence of the author or receiver is not the foundation upon 
which writing is built, perhaps absence provides for the ontological possibility of writing 
in the first place. This latter position is the position of Derrida in Limited, Inc. Writing 
comes before speech—not in the “literal” sense that pre-historic beings marked in the dirt 
before they realized that they could use their voices to communicate—but in a strictly 
ontological sense. Speech, which assumes both an objectively present speaker and 
receiver, is still ultimately dependent upon the dual meaning of difference—that which 
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differs in both an eternal and temporal sense. Differance is the absence that represents the 
primordial condition for presence.  
 According to Derrida, insofar as Austin’s speech-act theory begins in terms of the 
presence of the speaker and receiver, it brackets the deeper, ontological question of how 
such an account of meaning is made possible in the first place. This is the function of 
differance in Derrida’s critique—as an explanatory concept meant to expose the ways in 
which absence structures the nature of presence.  
 In Searle’s reply, “Reiterating the Differences,” it is precisely this preeminence of 
writing with which he must take issue. He disagrees with Derrida’s aforementioned 
definition of writing as a linguistic form that exists only insofar as there is an absence of 
the receiver. Searle is certainly willing to grant that “[w]riting makes it possible to 
communicate with an absent receiver, but it is not necessary for the receiver to be absent.” 
On the contrary, “Written communication can exist in the presence of the receiver, as for 
example, when I compose a shopping list for myself or pass notes to my companion 
during a concert or lecture.”107  
 If Derrida means that the absence of the receiver is either a necessary or sufficient 
condition for writing, then it appears as though he is committed to the idea that 
composing a shopping list for oneself is not writing. This is an awkward implication, to 
be sure, but even Searle does not think that this addresses the full brunt of Derrida’s 
critique of speech-act theory.108 In fact, the end product—meaningful marks on a page—
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is what Derrida calls “vulgar” writing. This is writing as it is understood via common 
sense, but it is not the ontological point about the nature of meaning and its relationship 
to presence and/or absence.  
 So what does Searle have to say about this deeper, ontological point about 
differance and the primordial status of writing in Derrida’s work? The short answer is, 
“not much.” According to Searle, it is simply not among the goals of speech-act theory to 
speculate about the ontological primacy (or non-primacy) of presence/absence or vice 
versa.109 Form this point of view, this is a problem that extends beyond the limits of 
speech-act theory, and it is unfair of Derrida to read Austin in such a way. 
 Ultimately, then, Searle’s disagreement with Derrida on the difference between 
writing and speech is this: whereas Derrida understands the absence of the receiver to be 
a necessary condition of writing, Searle does not. Instead, for Searle, the absence of the 
receiver is a mere accidental characteristic of some writing. Writing does not serve as a 
metaphor for underlying ontological commitments. It is simply the “relative permanence” 
of writing that distinguishes itself from speech.110 There is nothing deep or mysterious 
about this point. It is simply the case that, historically, writing tends to outlast speech. To 
pontificate on about things like differance is to engage in self-indulgent sophistry: “From 
the exciting to the banal and back again.”111 If it were to be summarized in one quip, this 
would be Searle’s opinion of Derrida’s thesis about the ontological primordiality of 
writing. 
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 The second major disagreement between Derrida and Searle is the nature and 
function of “intentionality” in the communicative process. If we recall Searle’s definition 
of writing, “a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the corresponding 
(intentional) speech act,” it is immediately evident that intentionality is a necessary 
condition for the speech act. If there is no intentionality, then there is no speech act. 
Although Derrida’s complex position does differ greatly from Searle’s, there is no reason 
to think that he disagrees on this particular level. Indeed, there is little controversy on this 
point—insofar as the phenomenon of intentionality is obviously a part of communication 
(i.e. I talk because I have someone to talk to). The disagreement, as is the case with the 
speech-writing problem, is hermeneutical. Unlike Searle, who wants to preserve the 
commonsense notion of intentionality as the directedness of a mind to something in the 
world, Derrida wants to explore the structural conditions of intentionality. For the latter 
philosopher, these conditions are constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality.  
 Searle defines intentionality as “that property of mind by which it is able to 
represent other things.”112 This definition echoes the point made by the phenomenologists 
Brentano and Husserl—that the mind is never purely abstract in the sense that it thinks 
independently of particular things in the world.113 Rather, it is always already directed at 
something. This is unavoidable, because any thought is a thought about something. Thus, 
when Searle defines intentionality in terms of its status as a necessary condition of 
                                                                    
112
 For Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Revolutions That as Yet Have No Model: Derrida’s Limited Inc,” 
Diacritics 10.4 (Winter 1980), 31.  
113
 “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, 
reference to a content, direction toward an object.” Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint. Translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 
1995), 88.  
Harris   62 
representation, he adheres to an understanding of intentionality shared by Brentano and 
Husserl. Because the speech-act theory of Searle and Austin aims to analyze the 
commonsense notion of the relationship between minds and the world, neither 
philosopher is really interested in exploring an extended hermeneutics of intentionality. If 
anything, such an undertaking would be counterproductive—especially if it results in a 
implosion of the commonsense principles whose salvaging was the theory’s original 
motivation.  
 Derrida, by contrast, is very much interested in intentionality’s ontological 
structure. While not disputing this conventional understanding of intentionality per se, he 
does want to problematize it in terms of its implicit underwriting of a specific ontological 
commitment. This commitment—which Derrida does want to critique—is to a 
metaphysics of what he calls “self-identity or self-presence.”114 But what does he mean 
by this? To illustrate his point, Derrida recalls Searle’s aforementioned objection in the 
context of the speech-writing problem, namely, the personal shopping list example.   
Again, it is Searle’s contention that the receiver’s presence or absence is merely 
accidental to writing because it is easy to imagine counterexamples to Derrida’s claim 
that writing is constituted by the receiver’s absence. The personal shopping list is such a 
counterexample.  
 Yet Derrida, without feigning politeness, offers the following points against 
Searle’s personal shopping list argument: 
To affirm, as does [Searle], that the receiver is present at the moment when I 
write a shopping list for myself, and, moreover, to turn this into an argument . . . is 
to settle for the shortest, most facile analysis. If both sender and receiver were 
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entirely present to themselves . . . how could they even be distinguished from one 
another? How could the message of the shopping list circulate among them?
115
 
 
Whereas Searle believes that both sender and receiver are present in the case of the 
personal shopping list on grounds of common sense (i.e. John writes a note to himself, 
John, so that he does not forget to buy x at the grocery store), Derrida is interested in how 
this is even possible to begin with. For the French philosopher, it is not at all clear that 
the John writing the note is or will be identical to the John who eventually reads the note. 
Further, even if this identity between the two Johns could somehow be demonstrated, 
then it is unclear how or to what extent that it is even possible to make an ontologically 
rigorous distinction between John, the writer and John, the [eventual] reader. According 
to Derrida, Searle is guilty of a blind faith in the self-presence of the writer/receiver, John, 
over time.  
 In fact, Derrida’s critique of this commonsense notion of self-presence over time 
is even more radical in the sense that he believes writing literally could not exist if this 
were the correct formulation of the situaton. For him, the very fact that eventual-reader-
John, is not identical to writer-John creates the absence that makes writing what it is. In 
accordance with his all-important notion of differance as the structural absence of all that 
is present (including both Johns), Derrida wants to emphasize the ontological status of 
writing. Against Searle’s idea that writing is simply one way among others for an author 
and a receiver to communicate, Derrida argues that writing “has a mind of its own.” The 
written text, which by nature operates in the absence of a self-present receiver, offers the 
philosopher a glimpse into writing as a way to think about ontology.  
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 The third and final disagreement between Searle and Derrida concerns the 
concept of iterability. Indeed, it could be argued that iterability is the primary issue in the 
entire exchange between the two philosophers. Iterability, in general terms at least, “is 
the necessary possibility that any meaningful item of language will remain meaningful 
(though not necessarily possess the same meaning) through its repetition across 
contexts.”116  
 At the heart of Searle’s position on the difference between writing and speech is 
his distinction between iterability and permanence. When Derrida argues that iterability 
represents the possibility for, say, ancient texts to be read today, Searle believes he is 
conflating the two concepts. “This confusion,” Searle writes, “lies at the heart of 
[Derrida’s] argument for assimilating features of the written text with features of spoken 
words.”117  
 But what is this distinction between iterability and permanence, according to 
Searle? Although Searle does not deny that ancient texts retain some meaning throughout 
entirely different contexts (iterability), he also argues that the primary reason that we are 
able to read them today is the obvious fact that writing is more permanent—that is to say, 
in the most obvious way possible, writing tends to last longer than speech because it can 
physically survive throughout long periods of time. “This relative permanence [of 
writing],” Searle argues, “allows for both the absence of the receiver and, equally 
important, the accumulation of linguistic acts in an extended text.”118 This idea of 
permanence is different from iterability because, while the former deals only with the 
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diachronic, “lasting” quality of written text, the latter deals specifically with the more 
properly philosophical problem of “stable meaning” across vastly different contexts.119 
Because Derrida refuses to acknowledge this important distinction between permanence 
and iterability, Searle believes that his argument lacks persuasiveness.  
 Once again, though, Derrida is operating on an ontological level that Searle 
plainly is not. Because differance involves both a-temporal and temporal structures of 
meaning, it is impossible for two utterances of the “same” word to be identical. Why? It 
is because these two utterances are constituted in part by their respective temporal 
contexts. Unlike Searle, who does not stray outside the purely diachronic understanding 
of time (as a sequence of more or less isolated events),
120
 Derrida aims to describe the 
nature of this temporal activity that is contained in the broader concept of meaning. In 
order to do this, he resorts again to the conceptual resources of presence and absence.  
In another difficult passage from Limited, Inc., Derrida argues the following:  
Iteration in its ‘purest’ form—and it is always impure—contains in itself the 
discrepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration. . . . [T]he remainder, 
although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is a 
differential structure escaping the logic of presence or the (simple or dialectical) 
opposition of presence and absence.”121 
 
When he says that iteration is “impure”, Derrida means that there is a discrepancy of 
meaning between utterance x in temporal context y and utterance x in temporal context z, 
namely, the discrepancy between y and z. While this point is (presumably) non-
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controversial, the heart of this argument is that the “remainder” (i.e. that which is not 
mutual to y and z) is not just accidental to the process of iteration. Rather, it is precisely 
this remainder that makes iteration possible in the first place. To echo earlier points, this 
absence of identity constitutes iterability just as much as the presence of identity does.  
 But what does this have to do with Searle’s distinction between permanence and 
iterability? Derrida addresses the point only in a small paragraph in Limited, Inc. In fact, 
it is difficult to see how he understands the distinction—if he acknowledges it at all.122 
For Derrida, Searle’s insistence that permanence is merely the survival of the written 
mark misses the deeper problem of iterability. There is no easy distinction between the 
“epistemological” problem (iterability) and the “metaphysical” problem (permanence). 
Rather, both concepts are implicated in the aforementioned play of differance, which 
encompasses epistemology and ontology alike.  
 To summarize, then, the three main disagreements around which the entire 
exchange revolves are: (1) the difference between speech and writing; (2) the nature of 
intentionality; and (3) the meaning and function of iterability. The question arises for our 
purposes, though: How do the positions of univocity and analogy function in light of the 
positions of Searle and Derrida, respectively?  
 Before we begin, I think it is safe to say that it is slightly more difficult to trace 
the assumed univocity of Searle than it is to do the same with analogy in Derrida. The 
primary reason for this is that speech-act theory is silent on properly ontological issues 
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such as the meaning of being qua being. Because Derrida takes his philosophical cue 
from Heidegger, this is more familiar ground for him.  
 Nevertheless, especially in the context of this exchange, there is a strong sense of 
univocity in Searle’s understanding of iterability. Although he is committed to saying that 
intentionality is a necessary condition for meaningful writing (and speech, for that 
matter), he is not committed to saying that this intentionality is constitutive of the 
meaning that is produced in a speech act—far from it, in fact.123 Instead, the iterability of 
the same “token” (Searle’s term for the physical sign, i.e. the actual piece of paper) exists 
independently from the speaker’s intentionality despite the fact that the speaker’s 
intentionality serves as a necessary condition for the token’s employment in 
communication.  
 Searle’s iterability is thus similar to Ryle’s concept of “knowledge-that” in this 
way. The token—like knowledge-that—is more or less a free-standing entity that can be 
employed by multiple speakers’ intentionalities for different purposes and in different 
contexts. This is univocity, as the respective physical tokens exist (or not) according to 
the law of identity. Token A is token A, and it cannot fail to be token A. If it did, then it 
would be A and ~A at the same time, which is absurd. On this paradigm, ultimately, 
iterability is not really a problem but an assumption. Once again, Searle’s ontological 
commitment of univocity is implicitly aligned with the commonsense view of iteration—
for better or for worse.
124
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 Once this univocal conception of iterability is understood, it is easy to see how 
Searle’s rejection of Derrida’s speech-writing distinction and the nature of intentionality 
follow. Because communication names a process by which some content can be—either 
successfully or not—transferred from one speaker/author to at least one receiver, the 
actual method of doing so is accidental rather than essential. Simply put, as long as there 
is this univocal content that is transferred from author to receiver, it does not really matter 
“how it gets there,” so to speak. Further, because the subject who is intentional can also 
be spoken of as an object among others, it is not problematic for Searle to say that author 
and receiver can be present as the same person. If the name “John” picks out a single, 
unchanging referent univocally across different temporal contexts, then it is natural for 
Searle to dismiss Derrida’s critique as an unnecessary confusion. It problematizes what 
does not need to be problematized.125 
 If this is the (common) sense in which Searle’s paradigm assumes univocity, how 
and to what extent is Derrida an advocate of analogy? Like Heidegger—indeed, perhaps 
more so than Heidegger—Derrida is a critic of what he perceives to be the Western 
theological enterprise of onto-theology, which means essentially reducing God to one 
being among others.
126
 This is why it might seem absurd to say that he shares common 
ground with a philosopher-theologian such as Aquinas, who is supposedly implicated in 
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such a view. Nevertheless I argue that Derrida’s signature concept of differance functions 
in a very similar manner to Aquinas’ Creator God.  
  If we recall our earlier discussion of Aquinas’ concept of analogy, we know that 
the theological motivation for such an understanding of divine predication is the 
preservation of God’s act of creation ex nihilo. Because he causes all things to be, 
everything that has being has its being through its relation to God. Aquinas’ emphasis on 
the ontological primacy of relation over individualized substances is an important move 
beyond Aristotelian primary substance. Following Aristotle’s notion of causation, we 
know that that which is caused shares the being of its cause—not in full, but in part. Thus, 
God’s transcendence is preserved in that we can predicate his being only in insufficient 
terms. God is “beyond being,” in this respect.127  
 It is my contention that Derrida’s differance serves in a similar role, in his 
philosophy. Although he would likely balk at the idea of attributing anything like a 
Thomist understanding of transcendence to himself, differance is transcendent, in a way. 
As Derrida never forgets to iterate throughout his vast oeuvre, differance is not a concept 
among others. It is not a particular being among others because this would mean 
incorrectly that its ontological significance lies with its presence as a particular being. 
Because it is supposed to represent the absence that makes such presences possible, 
differance—like Aquinas’ God—is beyond the realm of particular beings.
128
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 Differance serves as an impersonal creative force for all that is present. If it is true 
that the dynamic activity of differance is the very condition or possibility for all speech, 
then it too does its creative work ex nihilo. If this were not true, then we would have to 
resort to the awkward idea that, in fact, some present thing serves as the absence that is 
differance.
129
 But this cannot be; for the whole point of invoking differance in the first 
place is to show that the presence of that which is present owes itself to absence. Indeed, 
perhaps it is not too much to say that Derrida’s differance inherits the Thomist impetus to 
seek relation as primordial—not [present] substance.  
 To push this reading to its most extreme, we might say that differance bears 
witness to a different god—one that is not known via the incarnation of Christ. Especially 
towards the end of his career, it is well-known that Derrida’s project is deeply interested 
in negative theology.130 While it is not our present purpose to explore Derrida’s 
complicated and, frankly, confusing theology, it is enough to note that this apophatic 
impulse ironically makes for a profound alignment with Aquinas in this regard.   
 These are the ways in which Derrida is perhaps a curious advocate of analogy. Far 
from the popular caricatures of his work as a cheap, shortsighted despiser of reason, 
Derrida’s project represents a sincere and engaged hermeneutical exercise in light of the 
ontological difference between being qua being and particular beings. On this reading of 
his exchange with Searle, perhaps his greatest fault is to assume that speech-act theory is 
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willing or able to plumb such depths. Univocity’s greatest friend is the commonsense 
association with the logical law of identity, and thus it is no coincidence that Austin and 
Searle consider such common sense as a foundation for speech-act theory in general. 
Univocal iterability is a presupposition upon which his philosophy is founded—not a 
position for which he is positively arguing.  
Case Study 3: The “Biola School” and “Continental Philosophy of Religion” 
My argument for reading the analytic-continental divide within the framework of 
the Scholastic controversy between the positions of univocity and analogy has proceeded 
thus far with special attention to two case studies that represent the philosophical 
academy of the twentieth century at the highest possible levels. Ryle, Heidegger, Searle 
and Derrida are all recognized as leading philosophers of their respective fields and eras. 
As we explore our third and final case study, then, it may seem odd that a comparatively 
obscure exchange—that between the so-called “Biola School” and “continental 
philosophy of religion”—is chosen for these purposes. This exchange also differs from 
the other two in that entire movements are represented rather than just individuals. 
Nevertheless, I choose to include it here in order to expose the significance of the divide 
in Christian philosophy. It is part of my thesis, after all, that Christian philosophical 
theology occupies a unique position to make sense of the distinction between univocity 
and analogy in the contemporary context of the analytic-continental divide.  
What I mean here by “continental philosophy of religion” means what is common 
to the work of philosophers like Jean-Luc Marion, John D. Caputo, and Merold Westphal 
(among others): namely, a basic commitment to the hermeneutic nature of ontology. 
“Biola School” foundationalism, on the other hand, is a term borrowed from James K.A. 
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Smith, which signifies the epistemological turn of analytic philosophy of religion—most 
notably in the work of William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland.  
The specific encounter at issue here occurs in the form of some essays that 
represent both sides of this debate in a collection edited by Myron B. Penner, Christianity 
and the Postmodern Turn. The “Biola School”, represented by the philosophers Douglas 
Geivett and R. Scott Smith, argue that the “linguistic turn” that is characteristic of 
postmodernity is problematic because it reduces philosophy and theology to merely a 
discourse of competing narratives. What is needed, according to them, is an affirmation 
of epistemological foundationalism and an articulation of “properly basic” beliefs. These 
beliefs serve as objective foundations for truth claims, which allow theology to avoid the 
relativism of competing narratives. In response, Merold Westphal and James K.A. Smith 
argue that this linguistic turn does not have to be relativistic. In fact, it is even helpful in 
that it overcomes modern subjectivism and clears the way for a more robust participatory 
ontology in which knowledge and being belong together.  
By framing the task of philosophy in terms of “properly basic beliefs,” Geivett 
and (R. Scott) Smith assume a univocal concept of being of objects to which these 
propositions can correspond. It is in this correspondence that beliefs can be said to be true. 
Westphal and (James K.A.) Smith argue that an idea of a univocal ontology is 
fundamentally flawed. This is because the world is constituted not only of objects but 
also of various horizons of interpretation, which ultimately find their being in the God 
who is unknowable to creatures in his essence. Thus, along Thomist lines, the continental 
philosophy of Westphal and Smith assumes analogy rather than univocity.   
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 In Smith’s essay, “Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism: A Response to the ‘Biola 
School,’” he says that this Biola School is “governed by the assumption that 
postmodernism and Christian faith are mutually exclusive.”131 Of course, in order to 
understand the point being made here, everything depends on what is meant by 
“postmodernism” and “Christian faith.” Thus, in this final case study, I will attempt to 
provide a sketch of this claim—first according to the view of the Biola School, then with 
continental philosophy of religion.   
In 2003, J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig published the extraordinarily 
ambitious Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, in which both authors 
deal systematically with arguments for and against what they understand to be the most 
pertinent issues for Christian philosophy. The six-hundred and fifty-four page volume 
covers the question what of philosophy is in general all the way to a defense of the 
overall “coherence of Christian theism.”132 This text represents the most comprehensive 
exposition of the “Christian faith” as the Biola School understands it—at least in terms of 
its necessary philosophical presuppositions.   
Readers can already detect the spirit of Philosophical Foundations before even 
opening the book. Foundationalism is a way of knowing that begins with certain “self-
evident” propositions as objectively true and independent of their historical contingencies. 
These truths are named “basic beliefs” because of their indivisible nature, and it is upon 
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these basic beliefs that any other knowledge propositions must be founded.
133
 When 
Moreland and Craig draw from the work of likeminded philosophers such as Alvin 
Plantinga, then, it should come as no surprise that they are sympathetic to the 
philosophical task of situating belief in the Christian God as properly basic:  
[Reformed epistemology] appeals to a cognitive faculty, the sensus divinitatis to 
explain how belief in God is properly basic with respect to both justification and 
warrant, the latter being analyzed in terms of the proper functioning of our 
cognitive faculties.134 
 
This is a reference to Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief, where this task is carried 
out. The sensus divinitatis is a concept directly attributable to the theologian John Calvin 
in the first book of his Institutes of the Christian Religion. According to Plantinga, the 
sensus divinitatis is a “natural, inborn sense of God, or of divinity, that is the origin and 
source of the world's religions.”135 This idea lends itself quite well to the philosophical 
project of foundationalism because it is a theological presupposition that is “natural” and 
independent of its historicity.  
When Plantinga speaks of the sensus divinitatis as a universal cognitive faculty of 
human beings, he is positing an avenue through which the human mind may access the 
true and basic belief in God as the foundation for all other true beliefs. The role of 
apologetics for philosophers like Plantinga (if it has a role at all) is akin to the Socratic 
conception of the teacher as a “midwife” who brings to light a knowledge that was in the 
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student already.136 For the purposes of this study, the vital presupposition of 
foundationalism is exactly that: far from receiving a knowledge that is subject to the 
vicissitudes of history, the subject has already a timeless, immovable idea of God simply 
by, well, existing as a human being.137 This belief justifies other beliefs, and by reasoning 
“up,” as it were, objective truths become available to those who follow such a line of 
reasoning. This is the fundamental methodology that drives Philosophical Foundations of 
a Christian Worldview as a treatise.  
 Before moving on, it is important to locate quickly a relevant implication of this 
foundationalism. Although Moreland and Craig use most of Philosophical Foundations 
to posit a constructive model of the Christian worldview, they do critique competing 
views as well. Because a foundationalist epistemology depends on properly basic beliefs 
that are in some way self-evident, there is an “all or nothing” attitude that characterizes 
the enterprise. For one such example of this, we can consider their strong claims 
regarding the status of moral claims.  
 According to Moreland and Craig, there is no alternative to the dichotomy of 
moral absolutism and moral relativism. Rather, “since one must either be a relativist or an 
absolutist, then arguments against relativism count as arguments for absolutism.”138 
Although it may seem overly reductionist to argue that there are only two viable accounts 
of moral systems that actually maintain meaningful differences, this brand of 
foundationalism must regard this as an airtight claim. If God is, in fact, properly basic, 
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then to deny his existence means denying an objective foundation for all reality—moral 
claims certainly included.
 139
  
 Moreland and Craig are obviously sympathetic to the absolutist side of this 
dichotomy. For them, any relativistic account of morality is problematic because it 
contradicts the commonsense notion that some actions are intrinsically better or worse 
than others. If moral claims are redefined to mean merely the constructed conventions of 
particular cultures or individuals, there is no way to offer a consistent judgment regarding 
the ethical integrity of those particular cultures or individuals. On this relativist paradigm, 
therefore, objective morality is either non-existent or unintelligible. This is why, for 
Moreland and Craig, “the various versions of relativism are extremely problematic. 
Relativism does not appear to be a defensible moral doctrine, and hence, some form of 
absolutism would seem to follow.”140 
 Notice here the appeal to common sense. Much like the aforementioned sensus 
divinitatis, Moreland and Craig argue that human beings innately possess the ability to 
discern between good and evil—albeit perhaps in an unnuanced, raw manner. This 
common sense notion that murder is wrong, for example, is posited as an avenue towards 
discovering the metaphysical, objective good that the act of murder fails to realize. 
Disastrous consequences follow from the denial of this moral discernment that can be 
traced back to the lack of any foundational, properly basic belief, and there is really no 
way to justify such an irrational position.  
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For Moreland and Craig, such an absolutism regarding the properly basic belief in 
God is at the heart of any Christian philosophy. This is because the Christian claim is 
universal—true in the same way and in the same respect across any and all historical, 
cultural and subjective contexts.141 Because “postmodernism” in this case names an 
epistemological disposition that takes such contexts to be at least partly constitutive of 
knowledge claims, the postmodernist cannot assume the same sort of absolutism that the 
Biola School champions. This is what the Biola School means when it says that 
“postmodernism and Christian faith are mutually exclusive.”  
Although Smith’s critique of this position covers an array of issues associated 
with this outlook, there is one that is especially interesting for our purposes of 
understanding the role of univocity and analogy, namely, the relationship between 
language and the world. According to Smith, the Biola School understands this problem 
as follows: 
[The Biola School] tends to think that language is something of an obstacle to the 
world—that language is something that gets in the way of just experiencing the 
world itself. Language is a lens through which we see the world, albeit with some 
distortion, simply because there is this lens between the world and us.142 
 
For the Biola School, Smith argues, language functions in epistemology as a necessary 
evil. It is necessary because it serves as the only mediator between the knowing subject 
and the “external world”. Without it, there would be no means through which a common 
understanding of the world could be arrived upon. Language is evil, though, because by 
its very nature as mediator it cannot allow “direct access” to the world. Once language 
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emerges (usually for the sake of communicating knowledge claims), there is 
“interpretation,” which names an activity where a knowing subject tries to “sift through” 
the work of the “middle man” (language) in order to arrive upon the world as it really 
is.143  
 Smith argues that the Biola School misses something crucial in its reducing 
postmodernism to “an epistemological phenomenon [Smith’s emphasis].”144 This means 
that, according to Smith, the Biola School understands postmodernism as way of doing 
philosophy that only has consequences for the way the world is known or perceived. If 
indeed postmodernism is merely an epistemological phenomenon, it would mean that the 
fundamental structure of the world—and being qua being—is left unaltered. It is only the 
view of language that differs.  
 It is this position—postmodernism as a strictly epistemological phenomenon—
that Smith critiques. For him, the problem with the Biola School’s critique of 
postmodernism is that it does not properly account for postmodernism’s ontological 
implications. Following the hermeneutical tradition of Heidegger and Derrida, Smith 
argues that the so-called “external world” is always already subject to interpretation. 
Against the idea that we have to “sift through” language in order to get to the world as it 
is, Smith’s argues that even (and especially) that “world as it is” is not only mediated but 
also constituted in part by language.  
 But if this is true, and even the world is a “text to be interpreted,” as Smith says, 
then how is it possible to avoid the Biola School’s classic charge of relativism? Without 
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an absolute referent—something “beyond the text”—how is it possible to derive 
normativity from one reading as opposed to another (i.e. that murder is wrong and not 
right)?  
 Of course, Smith views outright relativism as a disastrous position, as well. As a 
Christian philosopher, he too is committed to the idea that there is a special normative 
quality in truth (i.e. we should believe the truth, not lies)—and that the person of Christ is 
intimately connected with it. Indeed, cheap quips such as “nothing is true” are little more 
than “sophomoric” nonsense for Smith.145 In fact, to read Smith’s version of 
postmodernism in such a way is to miss its most important claim, namely, that any so-
called “epistemology” which assumes a sharp distinction between a knowing subject over 
against a world of objects does so illegitimately. With the help of fellow postmoderns 
such as Heidegger and Derrida, Smith draws a fundamentally different picture of 
knowledge. Far from being separated from the world as an ideal observer who stands 
behind the world in order organize it in terms of its truths and lies, the knowing self is 
itself part of the world as yet another “kind of text requiring interpretation.”146 It is for 
precisely this reason that a banal relativism cannot be imagined in such an ontology. 
Relativism requires that one has a certain item of “knowledge” that is “true for me” (not 
necessarily true for another). This language of possession is extremely important because, 
without it, the ‘for’ in “true for me” makes very little sense. According to Smith, though, 
it is impossible to ‘have’ knowledge if it means that a detached subject holds certain 
objects of knowledge in some kind of mental depository. Indeed, one of the primary 
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motivations for adopting a postmodern, hermeneutic ontology is to accommodate the fact 
that knowledge is a complicated activity that is constituted by habits, traditions, and 
specific historical contexts (among other things). The finality that is implied in the 
language of possession is not a primary characteristic of knowledge, on this view.              
 Finally, for Smith, there is “no reason why such a claim is antithetical to Christian 
faith. Quite to the contrary, [he] think[s] it is a perceptive analysis of the conditions of 
finitude that constitute creaturehood.”147 Thus, rather than understanding the sensus 
divinitatus as an essentially non-historical source of foundational belief, this perspective 
emphasizes the incarnation of Christ the historical person as an interpretive horizon for 
knowledge. This is what Smith’s postmodernism acknowledges—even if such a 
theological commitment is not explicity in more secular figures like Heidegger and 
Derrida. Understood this way, it is not a departure but an affirmation of Christian 
philosophy as properly Christian.  
 At the most basic level, then, the most obvious disagreement that the Biola School 
maintains with Smith’s postmodernism concerns the nature of language and its 
relationship to the world. For the Biola School, language is a means to an end of arriving 
upon justified knowledge claims about the world-in-itself. For Smith’s postmodernism, 
language permeates the entirety of not only the world but also the self who interprets it. 
 The question for our purposes, of course, is how the opposing positions of 
univocity and analogy function in such a disagreement. The answer to this question lies 
most fundamentally with the general goal or expected outcome of knowledge claims and 
with the question, “What is knowledge for?” If different truth claims are predicated 
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univocally—bearing intrinsic value as truthful without reference to a transcendent order 
that is not itself predicable—then some version of the Biola School’s foundationalist 
paradigm seems to follow. If, however, knowledge claims are actually just different 
modes of being—always analogous to a transcendent order that is not predicable in the 
same way—then Smith’s postmodernism is the more plausible perspective. This is the 
way in which the frameworks of univocity and analogy can be employed as a clarification 
of the substantial differences here.  
 There is perhaps no better resource from which I could draw than Craig’s direct 
response to the issue at hand. On his website, Reasonable Faith, Dr. Craig was gracious 
enough to publish an answer to my question about his position on Scotus’ univocity: “Do 
you accept the view traditionally ascribed to Duns Scotus: namely, the univocity of being 
(pertaining to both God and creatures)?”148 His response, which I will not reproduce in 
full here for sake of space, is telling: 
I agree wholeheartedly with Scotus that there is a univocal concept of being 
which applies to both God and creatures. One of the aspects of Thomas Aquinas’ 
thought that I find most disturbing is his claim that we can speak of God only in 
analogical terms. Without univocity of meaning, we are left with agnosticism 
about the nature of God, able to say only what God is not, not what He is.149 
 
Craig’s rationale for adopting the Scotist position is rather simple. He finds Aquinas’ 
analogia entis “disturbing” because, at bottom, it is merely another name for negative 
theology. Of course, it is safe to say that this recourse to negative theology is not Aquinas’ 
intention. As we recall from his Summa Theologica, his position of analogy maintains 
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that the “[predication of God and creatures] is not diverse as in equivocals.”150 This is 
because, as creator and first cause, Aquinas’ God imparts his being to creation (and 
therefore created minds)—not fully, but partially. Thus, created minds bear only a trace 
of their creator—not his essence.  
 For advocates of univocity such as Craig, this is not “good enough” for 
meaningful speech about God. In order for our speech to be meaningful, it must describe 
its referents as they are in themselves. After all, unless it achieves this end, language 
proves to be an “obstacle” rather than a catalyst for truth.  
 If this is true, then there is a profound quality shared between Craig’s Biola 
School foundationalism and the univocity of Scotus—and even to Aristotelian primary 
substance. This quality is that of finality of the world as it is, being qua being. Following 
Scotus, Craig implies that the logical law of excluded middle must apply to the being of 
both creator and creation precisely because it provides the finality that is a necessary 
condition for knowledge. Thus, as Scotus reminds us, univocity is that which, if affirmed 
and denied, produces a contradiction. This univocity has the quality of finality because 
there is only one way to think about the affirmation and negation of a single, univocal 
term, namely, as a logical contradiction. Thus, univocal predication ends where it 
begins—within the framework of the law of excluded middle.  
Analogy fails, for Craig, because it cannot accomplish this finality. Unlike the 
plain assertion that “God is”, which derives its plausibility from the finality of its 
unequivocal negation of “God is not”, analogy always implies an unfinished excess that 
                                                                    
150
 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 13.  
Harris   83 
is constitutive of even the surest of claims.151 Indeed, this is an important part of what 
transcendence means in the first place—at least in terms of the Thomist analogia.  
If univocity is the (admitted) position of Craig of the Biola School, then, what 
about Smith’s postmodernism? There are many places in which such an identification 
with Aquinas’ analogia can be named in his work, but there is one particularly telling 
instance in his review of David Bentley Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite entitled 
“Questions About the Perception of ‘Christian Truth’: On the Affective Effects of 
Sin.”152 The review focuses primarily on a hermeneutics for a properly theological 
understanding of truth—especially as such an understanding makes sense in light of 
Christian witness to those outside of the tradition.  
 Against the finality of the law of non-contradiction as a universal medium 
through which even God is intelligible, Smith uses Hart’s book to emphasize the 
necessity of rhetoric as an ongoing witness to Christian truth. The persuasion that is 
inherent to the Christian claim is a particular hermeneutical disposition—one that cannot 
simply be mediated through a universally shared paradigm.153 This is not relativism, to be 
sure, because indeed part of what it means to believe something as a Christian is the wish 
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that others might join in belief. On this view, knowledge is for the sake of witnessing to a 
truth that cannot never be arrived upon in any final or settled manner. 
Thus, analogy functions on the side of Smith’s postmodernism insofar as it allows 
for the intelligibility of such a persuasion that is not mediated by a universal human 
rationality or “natural theology”.154  On this paradigm, there is no neutral reason between 
the Christian Logos and some other principle of individuation because—if the Christian 
Logos is that of the tradition—then “without him nothing was made that has been 
made.”155 This includes created minds, presumably, and such a philosophical 
anthropology is integral to Smith’s hermeneutic ontology.  
To summarize the case study, then, I have attempted to show how the controversy 
between the Biola School and continental philosophy of religion can be read as an 
extended exercise in the univocity-analogy debate. The Biola School maintains a loyal 
adherence to foundationalism as an epistemological methodology—appealing ultimately 
to “properly basic” beliefs as the groundwork for a given system of justified beliefs. 
Belief in God is among these properly basic beliefs, which, in turn, entails an 
epistemological gambit, of sorts: namely, that one is committed to a disjunction between 
some form of absolutism and some form of relativism. If belief in God is taken to be 
properly basic (or belief in the Christian God, at least), then absolutism must follow. If 
not, then relativism follows.  
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On the side of continental philosophy of religion, Smith’s defense of 
postmodernism is a defense of a via media between absolutism and relativism. If the 
relation of language to the world is constitutive rather than accidental, then the distance 
between the knowing subject and the world assumed by both is erased. This entails not 
just a hermeneutic epistemology but also a hermeneutic ontology—meaning that the 
world is a text to be interpreted. On this view, absolutism fails because it denies the 
creaturely, interpretive nature of knowledge; however, relativism also fails because it 
falsely assumes that the knowing subject is capable of withdrawing from its own horizons 
and judging others on some kind of equal plane with itself. In either case, some univocal 
“world” of beliefs is required.  
As is evident from Craig’s own words, the Biola School’s foundationalism is 
difficult to imagine without univocal predication of God and creatures. This is because, in 
Craig’s words, this “biblical realism” is necessary for meaningful theological speech 
and—by extension—knowledge claims about God. As I argued, there is another way in 
which it is possible to understand the impetus behind this position of univocity: namely, 
knowledge as constituted in part by finality. This finality is implied in the employment of 
the law of excluded middle, which makes for a simple either/or when it comes to 
univocity and equivocity.  
By contrast, Smith’s postmodernism offers a critique of this finality as an implicit 
criterion for knowledge. In fact, by assuming an analogical account of being, the implied 
transcendence of such a picture of knowledge disallows such finality. This is because 
belief in God’s existence can never be “arrived upon” in any settled sense. God is not a 
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particular, existing being, after all—even if it is true that particular beings do point 
towards God.  
This is the sense in which our final case study does, in fact, support a reading of 
the dispute in terms of univocity and analogy. Thus, the first of two main claims stated in 
the introduction—that there is indeed a substantial philosophical disagreement that marks 
the divide—is defended. In the next and final chapter, then, it is necessary to assess the 
preceding analysis in light of the second major claim of the study, namely, that Christian 
philosophical theology occupies a unique position in regards to the ability to adjudicate a 
more coherent debate between analytic and continental philosophers.  
Conclusion: Christian Philosophical Theology and the Divide 
 I have attempted to show that the metaphysical ideas of the univocity being and 
the analogy of being, as developed in Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, serve as a 
helpful explanatory horizon for understanding the analytic-continental divide. In order to 
do so, in the first chapter I sketched a context in which univocity and analogy could be 
defined clearly—drawing heavily from Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Categories. For 
Aristotle, we saw that the problem of being is understood as “being qua being”, which 
eventually leads to his account of primary substance, which is defined more or less by its 
logical integrity “in itself.”  
For Aquinas, by contrast, substance is only intelligible via the relational act of the 
transcendent Divine Being. Thus, because created minds receive God’s being only 
partially as part of God’s creation, it follows that God in his essence can be predicated 
only by analogy—never univocally. Being qua being is no longer primary substance “in 
itself”, but rather the Logos in whom the created order participates. There can be no 
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substance that exists “in itself” because there is no concept of being that can be 
meaningfully abstracted from the Divine Being.  
Next, we saw that Scotus’ doctrine of the univocity of being attempts to address 
what he argues is a fundamental problem with this primacy of analogy as it is argued in 
the work of Henry of Ghent. In order to make sense of analogy, Scotus argues, it is 
necessary first to have a univocal middle term in the analogy. So, while he does not want 
to do away with analogy, Scotus does argue that analogy cannot avoid the problem of 
equivocity without assuming a concept of being that can be univocally predicated of God 
and creatures. On this view, being qua being is indeed a concept that can be 
grammatically meaningful apart from Divine Being.  
Taking the position of univocity means that being qua being and its instantiations 
in particular beings can be predicated univocally without a loss of meaning. By contrast, 
the position of analogy means that being qua being is, in some sense, unsayable. Thus, 
being qua being can only be spoken analogously—never univocally. In order to explore 
the potential of the difference between univocity and analogy as the fundamental 
difference between the analytic and continental philosophy in the twentieth century, we 
then looked at three relevant case studies.  
The first of these case studies was an exchange between Gilbert Ryle and Martin 
Heidegger. United by their mutual disdain for the Cartesian picture of philosophical 
anthropology, clear differences are drawn in Ryle’s review of Heidegger’s classic text, 
Being and Time. While Ryle admires the phenomenological method, he critiques 
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology and its central question regarding the meaning 
of being in general. There is no room for “the things themselves” in this philosophy, Ryle 
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argues; therefore the risk of an outright equivocation of being is unavoidable. So, 
although Ryle himself is a cautious phenomenologist in the sense that he wants to make 
room for a so-called “knowledge-how”, he still maintains a strict univocity for 
“knowledge-that”—a way of talking about “the things themselves.” This is the sense in 
which Ryle and Heidegger are proponents of univocity and analogy, respectively.  
Next, we explored a more notorious encounter—namely, the loveless exchange 
between Searle and Derrida. This argument begins with Derrida’s “Signature, Event, 
Context”, a critique of speech-act theory. For Derrida, Austin and Searle underwrite an 
uncritical metaphysics of presence by assuming a direct iterability without reference the 
constitutive influence of temporality. The French iconoclast then proceeds to provide a 
corrective in the form of his notion of differance, which specifically includes temporal 
deferral as well as standard difference. Interestingly, then, Derrida’s differance functions 
in a similar way to Aquinas’ analogy of being because, while it is unsayable in itself, it 
permeates the entirety of particular beings. Nothing can be said without it. This critique is 
foreign to Searle, who denies that speech-act theory is operating on such a level. His 
commitment to univocity is based upon a commonsense acknowledgment of univocal 
iterability across time.  
Finally, we looked at the third case study of the present essay, that between the 
“Biola School” of Christian philosophy and continental philosophy of religion. In this 
exchange, we saw that the analytic Biola School operates on the basis of an 
epistemological foundationalism built on “properly basic beliefs”. Univocity is important 
here because without it such a system is difficult to found. As we saw explicitly with 
Craig’s own view on univocity, it is clear that there is an “either-or” when it comes to 
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predication of God and creatures—either there is univocity or equivocity. He prefers, the 
former, of course. The main critic of this position in this context is Smith, who opts for a 
hermeneutic epistemology that is analogical by nature. Instead of “arriving upon” 
knowledge of God, such a view assumes that God names a mystery that cannot be 
exhausted by univocal predication. Epistemology is always an extended exercise in 
intepretation, a Thomistic, analogical concept of being follows quite naturally. 
In the introduction of this essay, I sketched a threefold depiction of what I take to 
be good reasons for Christian philosophical theology’s unique position with regards to 
the potential adjudication of the analytic-continental divide in philosophy. Assuming that 
the univocity-analogy controversy does indeed represent a substantial difference between 
the opposing sides, the reasons for accepting such a position run as follows: 
1. Theological context is key to understanding the historical development of both 
analogy and univocity. This allows for a clearer definition of terms—one that 
includes without reservation or embarrassment the concept of God.  
2. In order for debate to be intelligibly Christian, charitable hermeneutics would 
have to be employed by both sides. Although this point might sound trivial, (or 
worse, sentimental), its importance is apparent in the train wreck that is the 
Derrida-Searle debate.  
3. A shared theological context of revelation offers even more common ground for 
debate.  
Thus, we will now conclude the argument by taking each of these points in order with 
reference to the previous analysis.  
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 That theology plays an important historical role in twentieth-century philosophy 
divide is, in one sense, obvious—even if the only reason for believing it lies with the 
purely diachronic “order of events” that produced the academic enterprise of philosophy. 
Heidegger himself was well on his way to becoming a priest in the Roman Catholic 
Church before he had his own “Lutheran conversion,” so to speak.156 Even Russell is 
implicated in the historical context of theology in the sense that he felt it necessary to 
write such a book as Why I am not a Christian. The raw fact of the matter is that 
philosophers tend to respond to what is around them, and theology does always seem to 
be around philosophers.  
 However, I argue that there is perhaps a deeper and more philosophically 
interesting sense in which the work of philosophers in the analytic-continental divide is 
always already permeated by certain amount of theology. To illustrate what I mean by 
this, I shall first turn to the continental side of this divide with Derrida.  
 It is not at all controversial to speak of a “theological turn” in various strands of 
continental philosophy after the Second World War. Indeed, there may be reason to think 
that continental philosophy rather intimately bound with philosophy even in discourses 
that do not make explicit use of categories given by any specific theological tradition.157 
Instead of understanding theology as a distraction from authentic philosophical issues, on 
such a view, otherwise secular philosophers such as Derrida seem to support the idea that 
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theology represents a “deepening of the specific philosophical impulses of 
phenomenology itself.”158 
 But even if this is true, what does theology as a deepening of philosophical 
inquiry look like? An answer to this question, I believe, can be found not coincidentally 
in one of the hallmarks shared by the great continentals, Heidegger and Derrida. In a 
filmed interview, Derrida remarks the following in a characteristically playful manner: 
As it’s often said, in the way that Heidegger thought—is questioning the 
privileged form of philosophy? Is thinking really questioning, as it’s often said? 
Couldn’t there be, before the question, a more ancient, profound, and radical 
movement that is not questioning, but is rather an affirmation? [my emphases]
159
 
 
Derrida’s final question in this threefold series hits on something that looks curiously like 
theology—albeit perhaps not in the sense of “faith seeking understanding” that is 
characteristic of the Christian tradition of Augustine and Anselm.160 If he is correct to say 
that philosophy has been understood primarily as a discipline of questioning, then 
Derrida, following Heidegger, seems to have arrived upon something that is not 
philosophy proper, yet integral to it nonetheless: namely, those “initial” conditions 
without which questioning is impossible.  
 The simple idea here is follows something like the following line of reasoning. 
The way in which the question is formed contributes to the answer of the question. As we 
explored briefly in the body of the first case study (Heidegger vs. Ryle), this is a key 
tenet of phenomenology. If this is true, then in a similar way it seems that the nature of 
what is not a question (i.e. the “affirmation”) out of which the question arises also plays a 
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constitutive role in the way the question is asked and, by transitive relation, to the answer 
of the question.161 This latter point is extremely important for understanding the second 
case study (Derrida vs. Searle), because it is these implicit relations that Derrida aims to 
uncover—the same relations that Searle wishes to dismiss as utter nonsense.  
 A difficult problem arises upon the raising of a further question: how is it possible 
to apply meaningful descriptions to such an “affirmation” that is not, by definition, 
amenable to the philosophical mode of questioning? The answer to this question, of 
course, would require a full-length study of its own (at least), so it is far beyond the scope 
of our present purposes here. There is one sense in which the beginning of a possible 
answer is in order, however. This subtle distinction between the modes of questioning 
and affirmation, I would argue, serves as a helpful designation for the roles of 
philosophical and theological discourse, respectively.  
Most agree that Derrida understands himself in the tradition of negative 
theology—even if he does critique such advocates of apophasis in the Christian tradition 
as “implicitly affirmative.”162 What is often less clear is how such a point of agreement 
between the Christian theological tradition and Derrida’s philosophy can be meaningfully 
maintained. This idea of the affirmation as a condition for the subsequent mode of 
questioning is helpful precisely because it provides a clear way to think about the role of 
theology as a deepening of philosophical inquiry. Far from evading philosophical inquiry, 
this theological mode of affirmation proves to be a deep and integral part of philosophy.  
                                                                    
161
 Represented slightly more formally, let us say that x, y, and z represent, respectively, the affirmation (x), 
the question (y), and the answer (z). By “transitive relation”, I simply mean that, if y maintains a 
constitutive relation to z, and x maintains the same constitutive relation to y, it must follow that x also 
maintains a constitutive relation to z.   
162
 Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, Derrida and Negative Theology (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 188.  
Harris   93 
Thus, it seems to be the case that continental philosophers such as Heidegger and 
Derrida are indeed better understood in light of the Judeo-Christian theological tradition. 
This is much more than a “historical accident” (i.e. simply cases in which the 
philosophers happen to come from situations in which theology is practiced). It is, on the 
contrary, inseparable from their respective projects.  
  Now, regarding the analytic side, it may seem more difficult to ascribe such deep 
continuity with the Christian theological tradition. This is not to say that analytic 
philosophers do not engage in philosophical theology or philosophy of religion, as has 
already been demonstrated plainly in the third and final case study of the present 
argument.163 It is rather to say that the same blurring of boundaries between philosophy 
and theology that is characteristic of continental philosophy does not seem to occur in 
analytic philosophy. If univocity is true, then this makes sense; for it is perfectly sensible 
to understand the being of objects—even objects considered “theological” (i.e. angels, 
spirits, etc.)—apart from any necessary relation to transcendence. 
 This difficulty of ascribing historical significance to analytic philosophy has not 
stopped scholars of intellectual history from ascribing such a development of analytic 
philosophy out of theological traditions, though.164 While the historical context of 
theology is usually more associated with continental philosophy—especially if 
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knowledge claims are taken to be in some way contingent upon such a historical 
context—there is a sense in which analytic philosophy can be understood in the tradition 
of great theologians such as Anselm and even Aquinas.165 Therefore it is certainly a 
mistake to equate mid-twentieth century logical positivism’s view that theology is 
“meaningless” with the contemporary scene of analytic philosophy. However, the 
inherent nominalistic tendency of univocity (and analytic philosophy) can lend itself to 
the idea of its purely accidental relationship to the theological tradition. Put simply, from 
such a perspective, the tradition is “right when it is right, and wrong when it is wrong.” 
Perhaps it goes without saying that the analytic program of, say, reformed epistemology 
could only be imagined in a late-Protestant paradigm in which tradition is not heralded 
with the same normative power as in the Catholic or Orthodox faiths.
166
  
 So, although the way in which analytic philosophy stems from certain theological 
developments through antiquity and the Middle Ages is difficult to trace, suffice it to say 
that, for the sake of this study, Christian philosophical theology remains in a more 
privileged position to better understand the intricacies of each side of the divide.  
 Next, briefly it is important to note the relevance of charitable hermeneutics in 
such a debate. This point is not philosophical, strictly speaking, so I mention it here only 
as a small addendum to the larger points being offered in favor of philosophical 
theology’s arable ground. While it is difficult to mount a rigorous positive case for a 
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hermeneutics of charity (one that does not surrender itself to an anti-philosophical 
naiveté), it seems clear that the so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion” is not a viable way 
forward—at least not if the goal is a synthesis between analytic and continental 
philosophers. 
 This point is obvious in light of the Derrida-Searle debate. The “first shot,” so to 
speak, Derrida’s essay entitled “Signature, Event Context,” seems to have tipped the first 
domino in this unfortunate direction. By subjecting Austin’s speech-act theory to a 
deeply phenomenological critique, Derrida accused the great philosopher of language of 
violating rules that he was not interested in following (or not following, for that matter). 
While this hermeneutics of suspicion on the part of Derrida does have its uses—perhaps 
in uncovering presuppositions that were previously implicit—it is difficult to justify such 
an ambush.  
 It may be the case that philosophy naturally begets the skeptical disposition that is 
characteristic of such a hermeneutics of suspicion. Indeed, long before Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche, the Socratic mode of questioning already embodied a similar kind of attitude 
toward philosophical positions—especially if they occupied a place of privilege in the 
realm of public opinion. 
 A properly Christian philosophical account of a hermeneutics of charity is beyond 
the scope of the present study, but before concluding it is worth mentioning the raw 
framework in which it could be imagined.
167
 Christian advocates of both univocity and 
analogy usually agree on the basic fact of God’s aseity—meaning that creatures are 
                                                                    
167
 The classic articulation of such an idea of charitable hermeneutics is in Augustine’s On Christian 
Doctrine: “Whoever, therefore, thinks that he understands the divine Scriptures . . .  finds a lesson there 
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contingent upon God, who is necessary. We have already explored how this idea is 
manifested in Aquinas’ participatory ontology of God’s creative, “pure actuality”, but 
aseity is also grounded in Scotus’ work despite his parting of ways with Aquinas on the 
univocity question. For Scotus, God’s aseity is grounded in the “infinite mode” of being. 
Since creatures are in a “finite mode”, they are, by definition, contingent (i.e. it is 
possible for them not to exist).
168
 So, even though God and creatures share a univocal 
concept of being, certainly his transcendence is maintained via this distinction between 
infinite and finite modes of being.
169
  
 This point about divine aseity is important for any thoroughly Christian 
hermeneutics of charity because—regardless of whether one is an advocate of univocity 
or analogy—it speaks to a sense in which the lasting impact of our rational discourse is 
fundamentally about a single, common subject. This source is he who is alone necessary, 
God himself.
170
  
 That such an admonition is available to both sides speaks to the final point, 
namely, shared theological context. Even academic philosophy is a profoundly political 
activity in the basic sense that it understands some ends to be better than others. As 
Derrida himself says that the philosophical mode of questioning is always constituted by 
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 Scotus Duns Scotus, Metaphysician (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Research Foundation, 1995), 
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 Of course, whether or not God’s transcendence is maintained to an adequate extent is a matter of 
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at least one such affirmation of a desired end: namely “it is better that we speak than we 
do not.”171  
 If it is true that a prior affirmations necessarily precede philosophy as a mode of 
questioning, then it seems to follow intuitively that shared prior affirmations would 
encourage a more coherent and meaningful philosophical debate. As Alasdair MacIntyre 
has persuasively argued in his classic text After Virtue, “There is no present which is not 
informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which always 
presents itself in the form of a telos.”172 Going further than Derrida’s point about the 
affirmation preceding the question, this fundamentally Aristotelian claim is about the 
teleological or purpose-oriented nature of human activity on a larger scale. Only by 
sharing such a telos can that same activity acquire intelligibility.  
 But what could this look like in the context of the analytic-continental divide? 
This answer is impossible to give in any definite manner, of course, but possible ways 
forward exist already—as evidenced by the third case study of the present essay. Unlike 
the cases of Ryle vs. Heidegger or Derrida vs. Searle, which seem to have failed to debate 
well on account of either “two ships passing in the night” or one side’s outright disdain 
for the other. The shared concepts of divine aseity, the sensus divinitatus, among others 
make for some arable ground for what is otherwise an encounter between philosophical 
foreigners. Instead of two impermeable systems that come into contact on grounds 
entirely of their own construal, this debate is essentially a hermeneutical exercise of the 
theological context both sides inherit in their respective attempts to do Christian 
philosophy.  
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 Now, of course, there is an obvious objection that is impossible to ignore here: 
namely, the problem of “orthodoxy” and philosophy. If the philosophical theologian must 
already affirm a certain telos before beginning her philosophical inquiry, it seems as 
though such an affirmation undermines the philosophical inquiry before the latter even 
begins. After all, the circularity of setting out to prove what is already assumed is clearly 
against the desire to discover.
173
   
 This critique represents an authentic response to a temptation associated with such 
appeals to theological commonality. If indeed the discussion contains assumptions that 
limit the sphere of allowable inquiry, then indeed it seems that the paradigm of 
philosophy as a mode of questioning is limited by definition. However if the critique is 
simply that philosophy is not skeptical enough, then it is difficult to see what the problem 
is with the analytic-continental divide in the first place. Perhaps such a divide is not a 
problem but merely a natural consequence of the boundless inquiry of the discipline—
two streams of thought that happen to have diverged in the twentieth century.  
 Without disparaging this potential line of reasoning, it lies beyond the scope of 
the present essay because the impetus behind the latter is the idea that the divide ought to 
be addressed in some kind of conciliatory manner.  
 These three points about the potential of theology as a source of commonality 
between analytic and continental philosophers represent a commonsense framework 
within which meaningful debate can occur (and is occurring already, as we have seen). 
So, while it is impossible to know how the analytic-continental divide will play out into 
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the twenty-first century and beyond, this essay has attempted to show via specific 
examples that careful attention to theological developments in philosophy (and vice 
versa) can encourage a much deeper, more fruitful mode of philosophical inquiry.  
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